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UCLA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36529, 
commentator called the broadening of federal judicial power during 
and after the Civil War the greatest expansion in our history and 
highlighted its importance: "[Iln crabbed and obscure jurisdic- , 
tional statutes a hundred years old we may trace out great shifts of 
power, -shifts that left the nation supreme over the states in 1876 
. . . ."3 The power is exercised pursuant to a two-tier authorization. 
Article I11 of the Constitution4 describes its outer limits, and Con- 
gress has effectuated the constitutional grant in various statutes.5 
The constitutional and statutory grants are not co-extensive; in 
some areas, the Constitution is less restrictive than C~ngress .~ 
$ 1332 (1982)). The Supreme Court limited the scope of that jurisdiction early by creat- 
ing the complete diversity rule, Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806), 
but has also made clear that the rule is not constitutionally required. State Farm Fire & 
Casualty Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523 (1967). 
2. See, e.g., AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDIC- 
TION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS (1969); Chadbourn & Levin, Original 
Jurisdiction of Federal Questions, 90 U. PA. L. REV. 639 (1942); Hirschman, Whose 
Law Is It Anyway? A Reconsideration of Federal Question Jurisdiction Over Cases of 
Mixed State and Federal Law, 60 IND. L.J. 17 (1984); Mishkin, The Federal "Question" 
in the District Courts, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 157 (1953) (all concerning federal question 
jurisdiction); Frank, An Idea Whose Time Is Still Here, 70 A.B.A. J., June 1984, at 17; 
Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARV. L. REV. 483 (1928); 
Marsh, Diversity Jurisdiction: Scapegoat of Overcrowded Fedeml Courts, 48 BROOKLYN 
L. REV. 197 (1982); Rowe, Abolishing Diversity Jurisdiction: Positive Side Efects and 
Potential for Further Reforms, 92 HARV. L. REV. 963 (1979); Rowe & Sibley, Beyond 
Diversity: Federal Multiparty, Multiform Jurisdiction, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 7 (1986); 
Rubin, An Idea Whose Time Has Gone, 70 A.B.A. J., June 1984, at 16 (all concerning 
diversity jurisdiction). 
3. Wiecek, The Reconstruction of Federal Judicial Power, 1863-1875, 13 AM. J. 
LEGAL HIST. 333, 333 (1969). 
4. U.S. CONST. art. 111, 8 2 provides: 
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising 
under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties 
made, or which shall be made, under their Authority; to all cases affect- 
ing Ambassadors, or other Public Ministers and Consuls; to all Cases of 
* admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction; to Controversies to which the 
United States shall be a Party; to Controversies between two or more 
States; between a State and Citizens of another State; between Citizens of 
different States, between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under 
Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, 
and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects. 
5. See 28 U.S.C. $$ 1330-1345 (1982). Cases invoking federal jurisdiction pursu- 
ant to 28 U.S.C. $ 1331 (conferring original jurisdiction on the district courts for "civil 
actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States") are com- 
monly referred to as "federal question cases." See, e.g., Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 807; 
Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 673 (1986). 
6. For example, Congress allows district courts to hear diversity cases only if the 
amount in controversy exceeds $10,000. 28 U.S.C. 4 1332 (1982). A similar limitation 
applied to cases arising under federal law within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. $ 1331 
(1982), but Congress removed the monetary floor in 1980. Federal Question Jurisdic- 
tional Amendments Act of 1980, 15 U.S.C. $2072 (1982); 28 U.S.C. $ 1331 (1982). 
Heinonline - -  36 UCLA L. Rev. 530 1988-1989 
19891 DECLARA TOR Y JUDGMENT ACT 53 1 
Federal question and diversity cases constitute the largest part 
of federal district courts' workloads, other than actions by or 
against the federal government.' Perhaps partially for that reason, 
the Supreme Court moved early to limit the cases inferior courts 
may hear under statutes governing federal question and diversity 
jurisdiction. Strawbridge v. Curtiss8 held that in diversity cases it is 
insufficient for merely some of the opposing parties to be from dif- 
ferent states; instead, no plaintiff may be from the same state as any 
defendant. In the area of federal question jurisdiction, the Court 
has made clear that a case does not arise under federal law unless a 
federal issue of substantial importance appears on the face of the 
plaintiff's well-pleaded ~omplaint .~  Thus, federal issues arising in 
an answer or reply, no matter how central to the case or how sub- 
stantial, do not suffice to permit a case to be heard in federal court. 
This short summary is deceptively simple, however; as one com- 
mentator has observed: 
Though the meaning of this phrase ["arising under"] has 
attracted the interest of such giants of the bench as Marshall, 
Waite, Bradley, the first Harlan, Holmes, Cardozo, and Frank- 
furter, and has been the subject of voluminous scholarly writing, 
it cannot be said that any clear test has yet been developed to 
determine which cases "arise under" the Constitution, laws, or 
'treaties of the United States.lo 
Particularly vexing problems about federal question jurisdic- 
tion arise in cases pleaded under the federal Declaratory Judgment 
Act." A declaratory judgment action is designed to permit a party 
to obtain an "authoritative judicial statement of the legal relation- 
7. In the year ending June 30, 1986, for example, 254,828 cases were filed in the 
district courts. Cases involving the federal government accounted for 91,830 of those. 
There were 98,747 private party federal question cases and 63,672 diversity cases filed. 
L. MECHAM, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE 
OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 1986, at 8, 175 (1986). Of those, only 11,698 were 
brought under the fonts of specialized jurisdiction in 28 U.S.C. $8 1334, 1337, 1338 
(1982). L. MECHAM, supra, at 175-77. 
8. 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806). 
9. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 804. The well-pleaded complaint rule originated in 
the nineteenth century. See generally Doernberg, There's No Reason for It; It's Just Our 
Policy: Why the Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule Sabotages the Purposes of Federal Ques- 
tion Jurisdiction, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 597 (1987). The case most commonly cited for the 
proposition is Louisville & N.R.R. v. Mottley, 21 1 U.S. 149 (1908). Doernberg, supra, 
at 598 n.7. 
10. C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 91 (4th ed. 1983) (footnote 
omitted). 
11. 28 U.S.C. $8 2201-2202 (1982); see also Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum 
Co., 339 U.S. 667 (1950); infra notes 61-65 and accompanying text. 
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ships,"12 regardless of whether a coercive legal or equitable remedy 
is sought. Once obtained, the judgment has res judicata effect.13 
Declaratory judgment actions, a comparatively recent development 
in the United States,14 are now routine in the federal courts.15 De- 
spite their prevalence, however, the Supreme Court's efforts to de- 
fine the contours of federal question jurisdiction in these cases have 
been neither successful nor coherent.l6 Parties seeking a federal de- 
claratory judgment may present a substantial federal question in 
their complaints, only to find that the federal courts will refuse ju- 
risdiction. The Supreme Court has interpreted the federal Declara- 
tory Judgment Act to be "procedural only," and therefore without 
jurisdictional effect. l7 Taken literally, this approach removes from 
federal jurisdiction three important categories of federal question 
cases otherwise proper under the Declaratory Judgment Act: 
(1) "mirror-image" cases, in which a potential defendant to a feder- 
ally created cause of action brings a declaratory judgment case to 
precipitate judicial resolution of the dispute, rather than waiting on 
tenterhooks for the other disputant to sue, (2) "federal defense," 
and (3) "federal reply" cases, in both of which the declaratory judg- 
ment action raises federal issues that otherwise would be pleaded 
responsively to a state-created cause of action.18 
This Article examines the Court's treatment of declaratory 
judgment actions. It demonstrates that the Court's "procedural- 
only" view of the Act frustrates congressional intent and is neither 
analytically sound nor practical.19 Part I discusses the general rules 
12. Note, Federal Question Jurisdiction of Federal Courts and the Declaratory Judg- 
ment Act, 4 VAND. L. REV. 827, 830 (1951). 
13. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS 5 33 (1982). 
14. See infra notes 148-50 and accompanying text. 
15. Statistics on the number of federal declaratory judgment filings per year are not 
kept. However, the annotations of cases decided under the federal Declaratory Judg- 
ment Act fill nearly 500 pages of the United States Code Annotated. See 28 U.S.C.A. 
$5 2201-2202 (1982 & Supp. 1988). 
16. Indeed, the American Law Institute declared that "[ilf no other changes were 
to be made in federal question jurisdiction . . . [the analysis prescribed by the Supreme 
Court] should be repudiated." AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 2, at 171. 
17. See infra notes 62-63, 78, and accompanying text. 
18. For a discussion of these categories, see infra notes 82-84, 97-1 11, and accom- 
panying text. 
19. Others made similar suggestions decades ago, but none closely examined the 
legislative history of the Act. Moreover, because the Court's doctrine was not well 
established when they wrote, none had the opportunity to observe the full extent of the 
anomalies and inconsistencies created by the Court's jurisdictional approach. See, e.g., 
Trautman, Federal Right Jurisdiction and the Declaratory Remedy, 7 VAND. L. REV. 
445 (1954); Note, Federal Question Jurisdiction and the Declaratory Judgment Act, 55 
KY.  L.J. 150 (1966); Note, supra note 12, at 82. 
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governing federal question jurisdiction and the Court's method for 
dealing with declaratory judgment cases. Part I1 explores the his- 
tory and purpose of the Declaratory Judgment Act and its relation- 
ship to federal question jurisdiction. This study demonstrates that 
the Supreme Court's assumptions about the jurisdictional import of 
the Declaratory Judgment Act find no support in the legislative his- 
tory. Further, it shows that the Court's stated approach to subject 
matter jurisdiction questions in declaratory judgment cases is di- 
rectly in conflict with Congress's intentions. Part I11 examines the 
Court's confused treatment of declaratory judgment cases. It shows 
that, while professing to allow the Declaratory Judgment Act no 
jurisdictional effe~t,~O the Court has endorsed cases and procedures 
that permit the Act to expand federal question jurisdiction. Thus, 
in limited situations the Court has given effect to congressional in- 
tent, albeit unintentionally. Part IV shows that the anomaly cre- 
ated by the Court can only be reconciled with congressional intent 
by giving the Act the full jurisdictional effect Congress clearly con- 
templated. This solution is contrary to the Court's express position, 
but is the only way in which the true purpose of the Declaratory 
Judgment Act can be served. 
I. THE RULES OF FEDERAL QUESTION JURISDICTION AND T H E  
SUPREME COURT'S TREATMENT OF DECLARATORY 
JUDGMENT CASES 
Congress made no enduring grant of federal question jurisdic- 
tion to federal trial courts until 1875.21 The 1875 amended 
and re~odif ied,~~ remains the basis for such jurisdiction today. The 
statute's language has always paralleled the constitutional grant.24 
In its present version, the statute provides that "[tlhe district courts 
shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the 
20. See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1 
(1983); Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667 (1950). 
21. In 1801, in the "Midnight Judges Act," Congress created federal question juris- 
diction, but the grant survived President Adams's Federalist administration by barely a 
year before the Jeffersonian Republicans repealed it. Act of Feb. 13, 1801, ch. 4, 4 11, 2 
Stat. 89, 92, repealed by Act of Mar. 8, 1802, ch. 8, 8 1, 2 Stat. 132. 
22. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, 8 1, 18 Stat. 470. 
23. See Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-754, 8 703(2), 90 Stat. 2721 (current 
version at 28 U.S.C. 5 1331 (1982)); Act of July 25, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-554, 
8 1331(a), 72 Stat. 415; Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 8 1331, 62 Stat. 869, 930; Act of 
Mar. 3, 191 1, ch. 231, 5 24, 36 Stat. 1087, 1091; Act of Aug. 13, 1888, ch. 866, Ej 1, 25 
Stat. 433, 434; Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 373, 4 2, 24 Stat. 552, 553. 
24. See supra note 4. 
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Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United  state^."^' Nonetheless, 
this simple wording has given rise to a remarkable amount of litiga- 
tion in the Supreme Court, as the Court has struggled to give con- 
sistent and principled meaning to the phrase "arising under."26 
Some have de~paired.~' Review of the Court's .efforts in this area 
demonstrates why. 
25. 28 U.S.C. 5 1331 (1982). Federal question cases can also reach the district 
courts after removal from the state courts, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1441 (1982). Since 
1875, Congress has allowed cases to be removed to the federal courts from the state 
courts if, inter alia, a federal question is presented. See Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 
fj 1441, 62 Stat. 869, 937-38 (current version at 28 U.S.C. 9 1441 (1982)); Act of Mar. 
3, 1911, ch. 231, 5 24, 36 Stat. 1087, 1091; Act of Aug. 13, 1888, ch. 866, 5 1-2,25 Stat. 
433, 433-34; Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 373, 5 2, 24 Stat. 552, 553; Act of Mar. 3, 1875, 
ch. 137, 5 2, 18 Stat. 470, 470-71. 
Prior to 1887, either the plaintiff or the defendant could remove a case to the fed- 
eral courts if it arose under federal law within the meaning of the predecessor of 28 
U.S.C. 1331. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, 5 2, 18 Stat. 470,470-71. In 1887, how- 
ever, Congress amended the statute and eliminated the plaintiff's power to remove. Act 
of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 373, 8 2, 24 Stat. 552, 553. Although the Court continued to treat 
removal cases as analytically distinct from the original jurisdiction cases, by 1894 the 
two lines of cases had merged. The standards for removal jurisdiction in federal ques- 
tion cases became the same as those for original jurisdiction. See Doernberg, supra note 
9, at 626. We will therefore discuss the cases only in terms of the evolving standards of 
when a federal question exists for jurisdictional purposes, rather than artificially distin- 
guishing between original and removal cases. 
26. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, after 
briefly tracing the development of statutory federal question jurisdiction, notes why the 
Court has had to struggle so hard: 
Although the language of section 1331 mirrors the language of Arti- 
cle I11 of the Constitution, it has long been settled that the statutory grant 
of "arising under" jurisdiction does not extend to the full limits of the 
Constitution. . . . Its exact reach, however, has perplexed both scholars 
and the federal judiciary almost as long-perhaps inevitably, because 
there is scant indication that Congress actually intended to draw a nar- 
rower boundary. . . . Apparently, the Supreme Court, reluctant to treat 
every "arising under" case as a constitutional question and sobered at the 
implication for diminished state court jurisdiction if the statutory grant 
were interpreted as coextensive with the Constitution, simply indulged 
the fiction that Congress, even though using the same language as the 
Constitution, had not intended the same meaning. . . . Cut loose from 
actual congressional intent, the federal courts have struggled to find prin- 
cipled boundaries to the 1875 Act. 
Rogers v. Platt, 814 F.2d 683, 687 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (citations omitted). Thus, the Dis- 
trict of Columbia Circuit apparently credits the only piece of legislative history available 
for this provision of the 1875 Act. "This bill gives precisely the power which the Con- 
stitution confers-nothing more, nothing less." 2 CONG. REC. 4986 (1874) (statement 
of Sen. Carpenter). "Senator Carpenter (R. Wis.) was president pro tempore of the 
Senate and apparently the only legislator to comment on the 1575 Act on the Senate 
floc~." Doernberg, supra note 9, at 603 n.26. 
27 .  See supra text accompanying note 10. 
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Despair is nowhere more justified than in declaratory judgment 
cases. There the Court, in service of misperceived congressional in- 
tent, has constructed an analytical system that cannot withstand 
close scrutiny. The Court's jurisdictional inquiry turns upon analy- 
sis of nonexistent documents. This imports a certain air of unreality 
to the task and produces circumstances in which the same question 
may be either federal or nonfederal depending on which party 
brings it to the court's attention. A brief review of general federal 
question jurisdiction principles is necessary to understand the cases 
dealing with jurisdiction in the declaratory judgment area. 
Federal question jurisdiction cases confront a two-branch in- 
quiry. First, how important must the federal issue be to justify the 
case being heard in federal court? Second, in what part of the case 
must the federal issue appear? Need it be part of the plaintiff's 
claim, or does raising a federal defense or interposing a federal reply 
also invoke the power of the federal courts? Unfortunately, the 
Court has not always distinguished cases concerning the impor- 
tance branch of the jurisdictional inquiry from those involving the 
placement branch. Some cases are complicated by the presence of 
both problems. Moreover, the Court's treatment of the first inquiry 
has been inconsistent. 
, . 
A. The Importance of the Federal Issue 
Few cases have dealt explicitly with the importance of'the fed- 
eral issue as a factor in the jurisdictional inquiry, and in the early 
years of statutory federal question jurisdiction none did.28 The 
Court merely defined federal question jurisdiction negatively on a 
case-by-case basis by identifying individual situations that were not 
sufficient for its exercise, rather than by affirmatively delineating the 
characteristics of a federal question case.29 The Court did, how- 
28. In Provident Sav. Life Assurance Soc'y v. Ford, 114 U.S. 635 (1885), the Court 
dealt obliquely with the question. Ford sued in a New York court on a federal judgment 
against Provident Savings. Provident Savings sought to remove the case. Removal was 
denied, so the defendant sought Supreme Court review. The Court held that the case 
was not removable, since the judgment's federal character was irrelevant. The Court 
saw the judgment as evidence of a debt, and thus viewed it as a piece of property. The 
fact that the property was created by federal law did not, by itself, make a case involving 
the property a federal question case. Id. at 641-42. 
29. In Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter, 177 U.S. 505 (1900), plaintiff and defendant 
disputed ownership of a piece of land, and plaintiff brought an adverse suit. A federal 
statute authorized the action. Act of May 10, 1872, ch. 152, 7, 17 Stat. 91, 93. None- 
theless, the Court held that the case did not arise under federal law. Fcderal law merely 
permitted an adverse state action to be brought, functioning essentially a h  an cnuhlinp 
acr. The Court noted that 
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ever, articulate a distinction that ultimately is critical to under- 
standing the proper role of the ~eclaratory Judgment Act in the 
jurisprudence of federal question jurisdiction: 
A statute authorizing an action to establish a right is very 
different from one which creates a right to be established. An 
action brought under the one may involve no controversy as to 
the scope and effect of the statute, while in the other case it nec- 
essarily involves such a controversy, for the thing to be decided is 
the extent of the right given by the statute.30 
Thus, the Court recognized that a federal statute might create a 
procedural right to sue without creating or altering substantive 
rights. 
The first explicit definition of statutory federal question juris- 
diction came in American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co. 31 
There, the Court suggested that "[a] suit arises under the law that 
creates the cause of action."32 Although the Court did not directly 
discuss the importance branch of the jurisdictional inquiry,33 the 
case may imply that a federal issue involved in a case is not suffi- 
ciently important to justify federal question jurisdiction unless fed- 
a suit to enforce a right which takes its origin in the laws of the United 
States is not necessarily one arising under the Constitution or  laws of the 
United States, within the meaning of the jurisdiction clauses, for if it did 
[sic] every action to establish title to real estate (at least in the newer 
States) would be such a one. 
Shoshone, 177 U.S. at  507. Federal jurisdiction is only appropriate if a case "really and 
substantially" involves a dispute of federal law that would be outcome-determinative. 
Id. The Court later announced that the law creating the cause of action was the law 
under which the action arose, but it did so without disapproving Shoshone. See Ameri- 
can Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257 (1916). 
30. Shoshone, 177 U.S. at 510. 
31. 241 U.S. at 257. 
32. Id. at  260. In American Well Works, an alleged patent infringer sued the pat- 
entee for damages resulting from the patentee's threats to sue plaintiff and its customers. 
The Court found no federal jurisdiction, even though it was clear that patent questions 
would predominate in the case. American Well Works, the alleged infringer, pleaded 
that it had or  would soon apply for a patent on the disputed invention. Layne & Bowler 
clearly would plead that its threats and representations to plaintiff's customers and pro- 
spective customers were justified by its own patent and the fact that plaintiff's invention 
infringed the patent. Thus, substantial questions of patent law would determine the 
outcome of the litigation. But Justice Holmes, writing for the majority, announced that 
since American Well Works's cause of action was essentially an action for trade libel, a 
state claim, no federal question jurisdiction existed. Id. 
33. Indeed, Justice Holmes's majority opinion also did not directly discuss the 
placement branch of the test. We suggest that American Well Works can also be inter- 
preted as a placement case, without the announcement of a new standard for federal 
question jurisdiction. See infrn note 37; see also Doernberg, supra note 9, at 627, 630. 
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era1 law creates the cause of action.34 In any event, the Court 
finally announced a general test that defined cases included within 
the federal question jurisdiction statute, rather than one that merely 
defined such jurisdiction by exclusion. 
Five years later, the Court announced a different standard, up- 
holding federal jurisdiction in a case in which state law created the 
cause of action.35 
The general rule is that where it appears from the bill or 
statement of the plaintiff that the right to relief depends upon the 
construction or application of the Constitution or laws of the 
United States, and that such federal claim is not merely colora- 
ble, and rests upon a reasonable foundation, the District Court 
has jurisdiction . . . .36 
Thus, if a federal issue was outcome-determinative, the case quali- 
fied for federal jurisdiction. The Court appeared unconcerned 
about whether federal or state law created the cause of action.3' 
The Court's explicit treatment of the importance branch of the 
jurisdictional inquiry continues to shift. In GuIIy v. First National 
34. This implication is far from clear, however. Because Justice Holmes clearly 
recognized that the case might well turn on issues of patent law, American Well Works, 
241 U.S. at 260, the characterization is at least questionable. 
35. See Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180 (1921). 
36. Id. at 199. Smith brought a shareholder's derivative action complaining of the 
defendant's directors' proposed investment in some federal bonds that Smith claimed 
were unconstitutional. The state law under which the corporation was created permit- 
ted corporate investment only in lawful securities. Id. The Court upheld federal juris- 
diction because the dispositive question of the securities' lawfulness was a question of 
federal law. 
The quoted language also refers to the placement issue, so Smith may be viewed as 
a hybrid case involving both issues. Its primary significance, however, is its implicit 
repudiation of Justice Holmes's law-that-creates-the-cause-of-action test in American 
Well Works. 
37. However, the Court may simply have viewed American Well Works as a place- 
ment case, not an importance case. The patent issues there would arise in the defense; 
plaintiff could plead its trade libel claim without necessarily asserting the patent claim. 
Thus, the Court's apparent sudden shift of position may be merely a reflection of that 
view of the case, suggesting that the announcement of the new test was unnecessary. 
See Doernberg, supra note 9, at 630. 
Heinonline - -  36 UCLA L. Rev. 537 1988-1989 
UCLA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36529 
Bank,3* the Court declined to find federal jurisdiction because no 
federal question was actually in dispute:39 
The most one can say is that a question of federal law is lurking 
in the background, just as farther in the background there lurks a 
question of constitutional law, the question of state power in our 
federal form of government. A dispute so doubtful and conjec- 
tural, so far removed from plain necessity, is unavailing to extin- 
guish the jurisdiction of the states.40 
38. 299 U.S. 109 (1936). The Mississippi Collector of Taxes sued to collect a delin- 
quent tax. He brought the action in state court, but the bank removed to federal court, 
which retained the case over Gully's objection and dismissed the complaint. Justice 
Cardozo noted that the federal issue thought by the lower courts to justify federal ques- 
tion jurisdiction was that the state was only permitted to tax a national bank by virtue 
of a federal enabling act, Act of Mar. 4, 1923, ch. 267, 5 5219, 42 Stat. 1499 (current 
version at 12 U.S.C. 5 548 (1382)). The enabling act was necessary to overcome the 
Supreme Court's decision in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), 
which had declared a state attempt to tax a national bank unconstitutional under the 
Supremacy Clause. U.S. CONST. art. VI, 5 2. 
39. The defendant did not claim the state tax was unauthorized, as it might have 
done by challenging the constitutionality of the enabling act. The plaintiff tax collector 
obviously would not raise such an issue. Even if one of the parties had sought to litigate 
the constitutionality of the enabling act, federal jurisdiction would have failed because 
the issue would have arisen in the defense, not the complaint. See infra note 59. The 
only other way the federal matter might have arisen in the case was if the plaintiff 
pleaded the existence of the enabling act as a sort of condition precedent to its right to 
sue for the tax. But the plaintiff did not, and the Court ruled that the mere fact that a 
provision of federal law was antecedent to the plaintiff's right to sue did not make it 
important enough to support federal question jurisdiction. Shoshone was among th'e 
cases cited for this proposition. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text. 
In Gully, Justice Cardozo recited the test for federal question jurisdiction that the 
Court then recognized: 
To bring a case within the statute, a right or immunity created by the 
Constitution or laws of the United States must be an element, and an 
essential one, of the plaintiff's cause of action. . . . The right or immunity 
must be such that it will be supported if the Constitution or laws of the 
United States are given one construction or effect, and defeated if they 
receive another. . . . A genuine and present controversy, not merely a 
possible or conjectural one, must exist with reference thereto, . . . and the 
controversy must be disclosed upon the face of the complaint, unaided by 
the answer or by the petition for removal. 
Gully, 299 U.S. at 112-13 (citations omitted). Note that the first part of this discussion 
might be seen to refer indirectly to Justice Holmes's test in American Well Works, 
though Justice Cardozo did not cite that case. The second part clearly refers to the 
outcome-determinative test from Smith, though curiously that case, too, is not cited. 
The final part acknowledges the importance of the placement of the issue in the case, a 
bow to the rule articulated in Louisville & N.R.R. v. Mottley, 21 1 U.S. 149 (1908). See 
infra notes 53-57 and accompanying text. The third part of the test is Gully's contribu- 
tion to the law of statutory federal question jurisdiction. 
40. Gully, 299 U.S. at 117. Of course, extinguishing the jurisdiction of the states is 
not quite an.accurate concept, since the federal jurisdiction asserted by defendant was 
concurrent with state jurisdiction. On the other hand, state jurisdiction was being cxtin- 
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Thus, a potential dispute over federal law, even if outcome-determi- 
native, is unavailing to establish jurisdiction unless the parties actu- 
ally contest the issue. 
The Court's newest case concerning the importance branch of 
the jurisdictional inquiry is difficult to evaluate. In Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thomp~on,~l a state cause of action de- 
pended on an interpretation of federal law, similar to the plaintiff's 
claim in Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., which justified fed- 
eral jurisidi~tion.4~ In Merrell Dow, however, the Court refused to 
find federal question jurisdiction, noting that the federal issue, even 
though hotly disputed, was not sufficiently important.43 The major- 
ity did not deny that the federal issue was contested or that it might 
be outcome-determinative; it merely found the federal issue insuffi- 
ciently substantial to support federal question jurisdiction.44 
The Court also based its decision on the absence of a federal 
cause of action. The majority noted that Congress did not provide a 
private cause of action to individuals aggrieved by violations of the 
relevant federal law.45 From this, the majority concluded that con- 
gressional intent also proscribed federal jurisdiction of state law 
claims based in part on violations of the federal act.46 
One might construe the Court's opinion to overrule the out- 
come-determinative test,47 but the majority denied that intention.48 
guished in the sense that the case was removed from the state courts, which would 
thereafter not have an opportunity to affect it. 
41. 478 U.S. 804 (1986). In Merrell Dow, plaintiffs sought damages because of the 
allegedly deleterious effect of a drug on plaintiffs' unborn children. Plaintiffs pleaded 
several causes of action, including common law negligence, breach of warranty, strict 
liability, fraud, and gross negligence. Id. at 807. In a negligence count, plaintiffs al- 
leged that defendants had misbranded the drug within the meaning of the Federal Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. 44 301-391 (1982), and that such mislabeling con- 
stituted negligence under state law. 
42. See supra notes 3 6 3 7  and accompanying text. 
43. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 813-14. 
44. Id. 
45. Id. at 811. 
46. As Justice Brennan pointed out in dissent, it is not clear why the Court's con- 
clusion follows from its premise. Id. at 825. Congress's determination not to provide a 
federal cause of action does not compel the conclusion that Congress opposed states 
permitting state actions based on violation of federal standards or  that Congress was 
unwilling for federal courts to be open to such actions. Indeed, the majority's emphasis 
on the congressional intent underlying the absence of a federal cause of action seems to 
support an argument that all such actions, state or  federal, were preempted by the Food, 
Drug and Cosmetic Act, rather than that such cases were jurisdictionally ineligible for 
the federal forum. 
47. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text. 
48. See Merrel l  Dow, 478 U.S. at 814 11.12. Smith may he distinguishable. 111 M r r -  
ri.1: flow, thc Court explored whether Congress intended a private right of acricrn to 
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At the same time, the Court praised the cause-of-action t e ~ t . ~ 9  Per- 
haps the Court agrees with Justice HolmesSO that an outcome-deter- 
minative federal issue is only likely to be sufficiently ,important to 
support jurisdiction if it arises in a federally created cause of action. 
However, the Court certainly did not say so explicitly, so Merrell 
Dow's impact on the importance branch of the jurisdictional inquiry 
is not yet clear. The Court focused on the importance of the federal 
issue but did not indicate what factors make a federal issue impor- 
tant for jurisdictional purposes. 
The case does, however, represent a view of the importance 
factor different from the outcome-determinative test. Under the 
outcome-determinitive test, the question is whether the federal issue 
is important-or substantial-with respect to the particular case. 
In contrast, the Merrell Dow majority seemed to be more concerned 
about the federal issue's general importance outside the context of 
the individual cases5' Apart from Merrell Dow's ultimate effect on 
the importance inquiry, however, the decision also reaffirmed the 
jurisdictional rule concerning a federal issue's placement in a case, 
the other branch of the federal question jurisdiction inquiry that 
must now be considered. 
B. Placement of the Federal Issue in the Case 
The Court has consistently insisted that the federal issue ap- 
pear on the face of the plaintiff's well-pleaded complaint. This re- 
quirement is known as the "well-pleaded complaint rule." The rule 
is the placement branch of the jurisdictional inquiry. The develop- 
ment of the rule spanned two decades,52 but the most familiar for- 
mulation of the rule is found in Louisville & Nashville Railroad v. 
exist under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. In Smith, the plaintiff relied upon the 
Constitution, not upon a federal statute, so the Merrell Dow analysis loses some force. 
, On the other hand, the Court's approach in Merrell Dow suggests that in a Smith situa- 
tion, one should ask whether the Constitution's architects intended a private right of 
action to exist. .Although the Court frequently makes that sort of inquiry regarding 
congressional intent in statutory implication cases, see, e.g., California v. Sierra Club, 
451 U.S. 287 (1981); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979); Cort v. 
Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), it does not ask the cognate question in constitutional cases. 
See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979); Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics 
Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
49. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text. 
50. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
51. It is fair to say at this point that Merrell Dow created more confusion than it 
dispelled. See Doernberg, supra note 9, at 636-40. 
52. See Third St. & Suburban Ry. v. Lewis, 173 U.S. 457 (1899); Chappell v. 
Waterworth, 155 U.S. 102 (1894); Tennessee v. Union & Planters' Bank, 152 U.S. 454 
(1894); City of Shreveport v. Cole, 129 U.S. 36 (1889); Metcalf v. Watertown, 128 U.S. 
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M ~ t t l e y . ~ ~  In that case, the Court sua sponte ruled that it lacked 
subject matter jurisdiction because the federal issues did not appear 
on the face of the well-pleaded complaint: 
It is the settled interpretation of [the federal question juris- 
diction statute] that a suit arises under the Constitution and laws 
of the United States only when the plaintiff's statement of his 
own cause of action shows that it is based upon those laws or 
that Constitution. It is not enough that the plaintiff alleges some 
anticipated defense to his cause of action and asserts that the de- 
fense is invalidated by some provision of the Constitution of the 
United States. Although such allegations show that very likely, 
in the course of the litigation, a question under the Constitution 
would arise, they do not show that the suit, that is, the plaintiff's 
original cause of action, arises under the Con~t i tu t ion .~~ 
The Mottleys could have pleaded their action for breach of contract 
without reference to federal law; allegations concerning federal law 
were s~rp lusage .~~  
An analytical technique shows whether a complaint containing 
allegations of federal issues is well-pleaded. First, examine the com- 
plaint, with the federal issues included, to insure that it states a 
cause of action or, in the words of the Federal Rules, "a claim upon 
which relief can be granted."56 If it does, remove the federal allega- 
tions and examine the remaining nonfederal allegations to see 
whether the complaint continues to state a claim. If it does, the 
federal matter is not an essential part of the well-pleaded complaint, 
586 (1888). For a detailed, if hostile, treatment of the development of the well-pleaded 
complaint rule, see Doernberg, supra note 9. 
53. 211 U.S. 149 (1908). In 1871, the Mottleys released a claim against the rail- 
road in exchange for lifetime free passes. In 1906, Congress passed a statute forbidding 
railroads from furnishing free transportation. As a result, the railroad refused to renew 
the Mottleys' passes for 1907. See Hepburn Interstate Commerce Act of June 20, 1906, 
ch. 3591, 9 1, 34 Stat. 584, repealed by Act of Oct. 17, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-473, 8 4,92 
Stat. 1466. The Mottleys sued to obtain their passes, and pleaded that the railroad 
would assert that the new statute forbade its continued performance of the settlement 
contract. The Mottleys argued alternatively that the statute did not apply to preexisting 
agreements for free transportation, or that if it did, it was unconstitutional. 
54. Mottley, 211 U.S. at 152. 
55. Reduced to its bare bones, the Mottleys' complaint would have alleged, in es- 
sence, that they had a contract with the defendant under which the defendant was obli- 
gated to supply them with annual free passes, and that the defendant had refused to do 
so for 1907, thus breaching the contract. The defendant railroad, in turn, would have 
alleged the existence of the statute as an excuse for its nonperformance (interjecting a 
federal issue), and the Mottleys would have replied that the statute did not apply to 
them (interjecting another federal issue), or that if it did, it was unconstitutional (inter- 
jecting yet a third federal issue). But none of these federal issues would appear in the 
original complaint. ~ 
56. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). 
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and the case does not qualify for federal question jurisdiction. On 
the other hand, if the complaint fails to state a claim without the 
federal allegations, the federal issue is well pleaded and the com- 
plaint states a federal question case.57 
The well-pleaded complaint rule has reigned unchallenged in 
the courts.58 Justice Cardozo paid it homage in Gully v. First Na- 
tional B ~ n k , ~ g  and in 1986, the Court noted that it is still an impor- 
tant component of the federal question inquiry.60 Moreover, in the 
two cases prescribing the Court's method for dealing with jurisdic- 
tional problems presented by the Declaratory Judgment Act, the 
well-pleaded complaint rule was the sole ground for the Court's re- 
fusal to find jurisdiction. The Court's application of the well- 
pleaded complaint rule to declaratory judgment cases has, in fact, 
created the problem to which this Article is addressed. It is to those 
cases that we now turn. 
57. None of the cases discussing the well-pleaded complaint rule articulates this 
method of determining whether a particular complaint is well pleaded. We suggest that 
the technique described is, in fact, suited to determining whether the federal issue on 
which jurisdiction depends is appropriately included. 
58. Many commentators have argued that the rule ought to be abandoned or sub- 
stantially modified. See, e.g., AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 2, at 169-72; 
Chadbourn & Levin, supra note 2; Doernberg, supra note 9; Forrester, The Nature of a 
"Federal Question," 16 TUL. L. REV. 362 (1944); McCorkle v. First Pa. Banking & 
Trust Co., 459 F.2d 243, 251 (4th Cir. 1972). ("It is a frustration to dismiss a case 
which so obviously hinges on federal law and involves federal, rather than state, poli- 
cies."). Others, though fewer, have supported the rule. See, e.g., Bergman, Reappraisal 
of Federal Question Jurisdiction, 46 MICH. L. REV. 17 (1947); Mishkin, supra note 2. 
59. 299 U.S. 109 (1936); see also supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text. In 
fact, the well-pleaded complaint rule can itself explain the result in Gully. It was unnec- 
essary for Gully, the tax collector, to plead any federal matter in his complaint. He 
needed only to plead the existence of the contract and the Mississippi taxing statutes. 
The defendant bank might then have countered that Gully had no authority to tax the 
bank, citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), thus injecting a 
federal issue. Gully would have responded by arguing that the enabling act had over- 
ruled the result of McCulloch, injecting another federal issue. Neither federal matter, 
however, could properly appear in the complaint within the meaning of the well- 
pleaded complaint rule. 
60. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 808 (1986). 
However, the Court has explicitly refused to apply the rule to the Constitution's "aris- 
ing-under" provision. Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank, 461 U.S. 480 (1983). Thus, the 
rule applies only to the district court's exercise of original or removal jurisdiction, not to 
appellate jurisdiction that does not derive from 28 U.S.C. $ 1331 (1982). Were this not 
the case, the Supreme Court could never hear federal issues arising by way of defense or 
reply in cases heard in the state courts. The states might thus have the final word on 
important federal issues. 
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C. Declaratory Judgment Cases: The Method 
The Court first confronted the jurisdictional problems raised 
by declaratory judgment cases in SkeIZy Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum 
Co. 61 Skelly and Phillips contracted for Skelly to supply natural gas 
to Phillips. The obligation to supply the gas was contingent upon 
Phillips's obtaining a federal certificate before a certain date, failing 
which Skelly had an option to cancel the contract. The certificate 
was approved before the deadline, but was not issued until after the 
deadline. In between, Skelly repudiated the contract. Phillips 
brought an action seeking a declaration that the certificate had been 
timely issued and that the contract was in force. 
The Court found no jurisdiction. Justice Frankfurter reasoned 
that Congress did not intend the Declaratory Judgment Act to have 
any jurisdictional effect and that its purpose was merely to provide 
an additional remedy to federal litiganh62 Therefore, he said, no 
case can be brought in the federal courts under the Act that could 
not have been brought there without it.63 In Skelly, without the 
declaratory judgment remedy, Phillips's remedy would have been 
an action for damages, or perhaps specific performance, upon 
Skelly's failure to supply natural gas under the contract. The well- 
pleaded complaint in such an action would merely have pleaded the 
existence of the contract and Skelly's breach; no allegations con- 
cerning the issuance of the certificate would have been necessary to 
state the contract claim.64 The only federal issue in the case, when 
the federal certificate was effectively issued, would have arisen when 
the defendant Skelly pleaded the cancellation of the contract and 
the plaintiff Phillips replied that the cancellation option under the 
contract was terminated by the timely issuance of the federal certifi- 
61. 339 U.S. 667 (1950). 
62. The lack of historical basis for these assertions is discussed in Part I1 infra. 
63. This assertion, unquestionably present in Skelly, has been vigorously attacked: 
The proposition that a suit can be maintained in federal rather than 
state court only by virtue of the Declaratory Judgment Act may seem to 
contradict the statement found in many decisions, notably Skelly.. . . , 
that the Act "did not extend the [federal courts'] jurisdiction." But the 
statement cannot have been intended literally. The Act accomplished 
nothing if it did not allow some suits to be brought in federal court that ' 
could not have been brought there previously, . . . suits that otherwise 
would have been brought, if at all, in state court. 
Illinois ex rel. Barra v. Archer Daniels Midland Co., 704 F.2d 935, 939 (7th Cir. 1983) 
(quoting Skelly, 339 U.S. at 671, and citing E. BORCHARD, ECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 
232-33 (2d ed. 1941)). 
64. See supra notes 5 6 5 7  and accompanying text. 
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 ate.^^ The federal issue, rather than surfacing in the well-pleaded 
complaint, would have arisen as a response to the answer. 
The Skelly Court created the method of jurisdictional analysis 
for complaints seeking declaratory relief. To insure that the Declar- 
atory Judgment Act is not permitting any cases to come into federal 
court that could not have done so without it, courts must pretend 
that the plaintiff filed a coercive action-one seeking damages or 
injunctive relief. If the hypothetical coercive complaint would arise 
under federal law, then the declaratory judgment action arises 
under federal law. But if the hypothetical coercive complaint lacks 
federal question jurisdiction, then the declaratory action must be 
dismissed. To do otherwise, according to Justice Frankfurter, 
would extend Congress's intended scope of the Declaratory Judg- 
ment Act by enabling it to thrust into the federal courts cases that 
otherwise could not be entertained there. Skelly gave federal courts 
the technique for analyzing for declaratory judgment actions. But 
Skelly is not without its problems, as the Court's next foray into 
this area made clear. 
D. Declaratory Judgment Cases: The Madness 
Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Laborers Vacation 
forcefully demonstrated the difficulties engendered by 
Skelly's attempt to be faithful both to the well-pleaded complaint 
rule and to the Court's perception of the Declaratory Judgment 
Act's limited mission. The Franchise Tax Board attempted to col- 
lect taxes owed by beneficiaries of the Construction Laborers Vaca- 
tion Trust by commencing a two-count action in the California 
courts. One count sought a declaration under the California declar- 
atory judgment provision that the Employee Retirement Income Se- 
curity (ERISA) did not preempt a state tax levy on the 
Trust's funds. The other count sought to compel payment of the 
taxes by the Trust from the individuals' accrued benefits. The de- 
fendant Trust removed the action to the federal district court. 
The Supreme Court, relying upon the Skelly analysis, unani- 
mously ruled that there was no jur isdict i~n.~~ The Franchise Tax 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 
65. Therefore, the issuance of the federal certificate was not a condition precedent 
to Skelly's obligation to perform. It was a condition subsequent that cut off Skelly's 
right to cancel the contract. 
66. 463 U.S. 1 (1983). 
67. Employee Retirement Security Income Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. $4 1001-1461 
(1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
68. The Court recognized that the California declaratory judgment provisions 
under which the case was brought might not have been the product of the same under- 
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Board's claim for declaratory relief was analogized to an action for 
coercive relief. The Court did not need to draft the hypothetical 
complaint for the coercive action, as in Skelly, since the Franchise 
Tax Board's second cause of action seeking damages was the corre- 
sponding coercive action. That claim contained no federal issue in 
its well-pleaded ~ o m p l a i n t . ~ ~  The Court held that the declaratory 
judgment action, as in Skelly, was not a federal question case. 
Franchise Tax Board is complicated, however, by two factors. 
First, ERISA permits the trustee of a qualifying fund to bring an 
affirmative action for injunctive relief when ERISA rights and du- 
ties are at issue, and such an action must be brought in the federal 
courts.70 If the trustees had commenced an action against the 
Franchise Tax Board to recover the levy or to enjoin any attempt to 
collect it, the action clearly would have been federal. If the trustees 
had instead commenced a declaratory judgment action, Skelly anal- 
ysis would recognize that action as a proper federal case because the 
analogous coercive action is the Trust's action for an injunction. 
This presents the curious, and intellectually unsupportable, result 
that the Franchise Tax Board's declaratory action seeking an an- 
swer to the question "Does ERISA preempt?" is not a federal ques- 
tion case, whereas the Trust's declaratory action seeking an answer 
to the same question is. This is an unacceptable d i c h ~ t o m y . ~ ~  The
lying legislative intention as the federal act. Nonetheless, Justice Brennan noted that 
"fidelity to [Skelly's] spirit" demanded that state declaratory judgment actions be ana- 
lyzed in the same way as federal actions. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 17-18. 
69. The Franchise Tax Board's complaint alleged, in essence, that the tax was 
owed, that the Trust held assets belonging to the delinquent taxpayers, and that the 
Board's levy on the Trust's assets had been refused, entitling the Board to coercive 
relief. See id. at 5-7. The Trust's answer pleaded ERISA preemption, injecting a dis- 
positive federal issue into the case but failing to satisfy the well-pleaded complaint rule. 
See id. at 24. 
70. 29 U.S.C. Q 1132(a)(3), (e)(l) (1982); see also Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 
19-20. 
71. One might attempt to explain this problem by reference to general principles. 
"[Ilt is well established that a declaratory judgment action seeking to establish the inva- 
lidity of a threatened claim based on federal law 'arises under' federal law, while a 
declaratory judgment action seeking to establish a federal defense to a threatened pro- 
ceeding based on state law does not." Arden-Mayfair, Inc. v. Louart Corp., 434 F. 
Supp. 580, 584 (D. Del. 1977) (footnotes omitted). However, viewing Franchise Tax 
Bwrd in that light presents two problems. 
First, one can view the case from two perspectives. The Franchise Tax Board's 
action for declaratory judgment can be seen as an attempt to establish the invalidity of 
the Trust's federal claim for injunctive relief. See supra text accompanying note 70. 
Under that view, the Board's action would qualify for federal question jurisdiction 
under the Delaware district court's formulation. But the action can also be seen as the 
Franchise Tax Board's attempt to establish the invalidity of a federal defense to a state 
action, and then it would not qualify as a federal question case. See, e.g., Louisville & 
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Court previously made the same suggestion, indirectly: "It is the 
nature of the controversy, not the method of its presentation or the 
particular party who presents it, that is determinati~e."~~ That pro- 
nouncement, however much good sense it might make, seems to 
have lost its vitality in light of Franchise Tax B W I ~ .  
Second, in some declaratory judgment cases, !3 the courts have 
looked, to the defendant's underlying coercive action rather than the 
, - 
N.R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908); supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text. 
Thus, the Board's declaratory judgment action, for purposes of jurisdictional analysis, 
resembles a trompe I'oeil whose contours seem to shift as the viewer stares at them. 
Second, the resolution of the problem presented by the dual nature of the Franchise 
Tax Board's declaratory judgment action may depend upon whether the Trust's pre- 
emption argument is viewed as a claim or as a defense. This requires more general 
attention to the jurisdictional significance of federal preemption. For jurisdictional pur- 
poses, the Supreme Court divides preemption into two categories: 
Federal pre-einption is ordinarily a federal defense to the plaintiff's 
suit. As a defense, it does not appear on the face of a well-pleaded com- 
plaint, and, therefore, does not authorize removal to federal court. . . . 
. One corollary of the well-pleaded complaint rule developed in the case 
law, however, is that Congress may so completely pre-empt a particular 
area, that any civil complaint raising this select group of claims is neces- 
sarily federal in character. 
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 107 S. Ct. 1542, 1546 (1987) (citation omitted). 
Thus, the Court suggested a two-level approach to preemption for federal jurisdictional 
purposes. First, federal law may preempt state law in such a way as to defeat previously 
maintainable'state claims. See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 
(1964) (state.unfair competition law cannot prohibit copying of article which is not 
protected by federal patent law); McDermott v.' Wisconsin, 228 U.S. 115 (1913) (state 
statute prescribing specific labels for article in interstate commerce invalid in forbidding 
labels which conform with Federal Pure Food and Drugs Act). Second, federal law 
may convert a formerly state claim into a federal claim, in effect federalizing a state 
cause of action. This doctrine arose in Avco Corp. v. Acre Lodge 735, 390 U.S. 557 
(1968), and the Court specifically approved it in Metropolitan Life, 107 S. Ct. at 
1546-47. See also Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 107 S. Ct. 2425, 2430 (1987). Whether 
a particular state cause of action in apparent conflict with preemptive federal law falls 
within the first or second group depends upon Congress's intent. Metropolitan Life, 107 
S. Ct. at 1547-48. 
In, the context of ERISA itself, the Court seems to have resolved the matter par- 
tially by holding that actions brought by participants or beneficiaries of ERISA plans 
have been federalized under the Avco rationale. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 107 S. 
Ct. 1549, 1557 (1987); Metropolitan Life, 107 S. Ct. at 1547. That is not to say, how- 
ever, that any action, such as the Franchise Tax Board's, brought against an ERISA 
fund is also federalized. The Franchise Tax Board holding strongly suggests that it is 
not. One may justify this result by viewing Franchise Tax Board as within the first 
preemption category above. Indeed, it is not difficult to view preemption in this context 
as a defense only. That, unfortunately, does nothing to ameliorate the absurdity of 
federal jurisdiction being determined not by the issue presented, but rather by the iden- 
tity of the party who raises the issue. 
72. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 244 (1937) (citations omitted). 
73. See, e.g., Edelmann Co. v. Triple-A Specialty Co., 88 F.2d 852 (7th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 300 U.S. 680 (1937). 
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plaintiff's. Use of that technique in Franchise Tax Board would 
lead to the opposite result.74 To make matters worse, the Franchise 
Tax Board Court explicitly approved this technique, most notably 
used in Edelmann Co. v. Triple-A Specialty Co. ,75 without explain- 
ing why it did not apply it.76 
The Court's analytical system for determining jurisdiction in 
declaratory judgment cases is unsatisfying largely because of anom- 
alies and inconsistencies such as those in Franchise Tax Board. It 
excludes at least three types of cases that present federal issues in 
declaratory judgment complaints: cases in which potential federal 
defendants force adjudication of causes of action held by their ad- 
versaries, and cases in which federal supremacy issues would be 
raised in answers or replies in coercive actions but are part of the 
complaint in declaratory judgment actions. Yet, 'under Justice 
Frankfurter's Skelly analysis, the Court's method seems to be com- 
pelled by the combination of the well-pleaded complaint rule and 
the limited interpretation of the Declaratory Judgment Act: that it 
was not to have any jurisdictional effect. But is the Act so limited? 
The next section examines the Declaratory Judgment Act more 
closely to see whether Justice Frankfurter's broad assertion is prop- 
erly supported by the legislative history. That examination shows 
the need for correction in the Court's view of the Declaratory Judg- 
ment Act, both to give that Act and the congressional intent under- 
lying it their due and to arrive at a coherent policy of federal 
question jurisdiction in declaratory judgment cases. 
The history of the Declaratory Judgment demonstrates 
that Justice Frankfurter was not correct in interpreting it as "proce- 
dural only,"78 merely "enlarg[ing] the range of remedies available in 
the federal ~ o u r t s . ' ' ~ ~  Justice Frankfurter decided that the allega- 
74. Edelmann and the alternative method for determining jurisdiction in declara- 
tory judgment actions will be explored more fully in Part 111, infra. 
75. 88 F.2d at 852. See supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
76. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 19 n.19 (citing Edelmann). 
77. Others have briefly discussed the legislative history of the Act. See, e.g., 
Goldberg, The Influence of Procedural Rules on Federal Jurisdiction, 28 STAN. L. REV. 
395, 443-47 (1976); Mishkin, supra note 2, at 178 n.99. However, this is the first time 
that the legislative history is set forth in detail. 
78. Skelly, 339 U.S. at 671 (quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 
240 (1937)). 
79. Id. 
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tions of a declaratory judgment complaint could not be used to de- 
termine whether the case was within federal question jurisdiction, in 
contrast to the method normally used to determine federal question 
jurisdiction.sO If Justice Frankfurter was correct, the sole type of 
declaratory judgment case qualifying for federal question jurisdic- 
tion is one in which the plaintiff would have had a coercive claim 
presenting a federal que~tion.~' In at least three other situations, 
however, a plaintiff might necessarily plead a federal issue in a com- 
plaint seeking declaratory relief: (1) a "mirror-image" case, in 
which the party seeking the declaratory judgment would have been 
the defendant in a traditional federal-question coercive action but 
has not yet been (2) a "federal-defense" case, in which the 
defendant asserts a federal defense to the plaintiff's nonfederal coer- 
cive action;83 and (3) a "federal-reply" case, in which both the com- 
plaint and answer would include only state claims but where the 
plaintiff's reply would raise a federal issue.84 Although a well- 
pleaded federal question arises on the face of a declaratory judg- 
ment complaint in each of these cases, under Justice Frankfurter's 
approach the district court would lack jurisdiction to hear any of 
them. 
The practical difficulties and logical inconsistencies of the 
Skelly doctrinea5 are the direct product of Justice Frankfurter's as- 
sumptions about Congress's intent when it passed the Declaratory 
Judgment Act.86 But the legislative history of the Act does not sup- 
port his assumptions. Judicial correction is in order.87 Examina- 
- 
80. See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text. 
81. See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text. 
82. American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257 (1916), 
Edelmann, and Franchise Tax Board represent this kind of case. See supra notes 32-34, 
73-76, 6669,  and accompanying text. 
83. Louisville & N.R.R. v. Mottley, 21 1 U.S. 149 (1908), and Public Serv. Comm'n 
v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237 (1952), represent this genre. One can also view the Con- 
struction Laborers Vacation Trust's possible declaratory action on the facts of Franchise 
Tax Board in this light. See supra notes 66-72 and accompanying text. 
84. This is the category involved in Skelly. See supra notes 61-65 and accompany- 
ing text. 
85. See supra notes 66-76 and accompanying text; infra Part 111. 
86. Frankfurter did not discuss the Act's legislative history, but merely made un- 
supported references to Congress's intent and cited cases that did not examine the rele- 
vant legislative history. See Skelly, 339 U.S. at 671-74. 
87. Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 665 (1978) is a 
prime example of the Supreme Court revisiting prior holdings when new knowledge 
emerges that sheds light on the wisdom of prior conceptions of legislative intent. In 
Monell, the Court, after a "fresh analysis" of the legislative history of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1871, overruled the holding of Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), that munic- 
ipalities were immune from suit under that Act. 436 U.S. at 663-65; see also Braden v. 
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tion of the nature of the declaratory judgment device, the 
arguments for its adoption, and the fifteen-year effort to win con- 
gressional approval demonstrate the error of Justice Frankfurter's 
conclusion. Congress approved the declaratory judgment device 
precisely because it expanded the scope of federal court power and 
the timing of its exercise. Congress did not indicate that federal 
question jurisdiction was limited to cases in which a plaintiff also 
had a traditional, coercive federal question claim. In fact, strong, 
direct evidence shows that Congress explicitly intended to include 
at least two of the three excluded groups of cases, "mirror-image" 
federal question cases and "federal-defense" cases, within the ambit 
of district court jurisdiction. 
Treating the declaratory judgment complaint as a nonentity, as 
Justice Frankfurter prescribes, blunts congressional intent. In con- 
trast, using the declaratory judgment complaint as the point of ref- 
erence for statutory federal question jurisdictional purposes, just as 
with complaints seeking coercive relief, honors the intent of the leg- 
islature. Justice Frankfurter's analytical procedure under the Act 
misconstrues congressional concern about the Act's jurisdictional 
effect. Congress meant only to ensure that the declaratory judg- 
ment action be confined to cases within the constitutional bounda- 
ries of the case-and-controversy clause;88 it did not intend to limit 
federal question jurisdiction determinations under the statute.89 
The Declaratory Judgment Act does not have a tidy history. 
One must consider deliberations spanning the fifteen years when 
Congress actively considered the Act. In addition, one must be 
aware of contemporaneous judicial uncertainty about the declara- 
tory judgment's constitutionality. That uncertainty formed the 
backdrop for extensive discussions in Congress regarding the Act's 
jurisdictional limitations. But first, since declaratory judgments 
were a novelty in this country seventy years ago, one must consider 
the arguments of the early advocates of the device. Understanding 
their ideas about the jurisdictional implications of declaratory judg- 
30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484 (1973) (overruling a previous interpretation of 
the federal habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. 5 2241(a), after reexamining congressional 
intent); Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 69-70 (1946) (overruling a misconstruc- 
tion of the Nationality Act of 1940 because it was not proper to "place on the shoulders 
of Congress the burden of the Court's own error"); Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 
(1938) (overruling an erroneous interpretation of the Rules of Decision Act 96 years 
earlier). 
88. See U.S. CONST. art. 111, § 2; infra notes 170-76 and accompanying tent. 
89. See 28 U.S.C. $ 1331 (1982). 
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ment. acts helps to reveal what Congress intended the federal act to 
do. 
A. Early Supporters' Views of the Jurisdictional Significance of 
Declaratory Judgment Acts 
Although other jurisdictions had used declaratory judgments 
for some time,90 they were virtually unknown to American law until 
this ~entury .~ '  Articles by Professors Edson R. Sunderland and Ed- 
win M. Borchardg2 began the effort to introduce declaratory judg- 
ments in this country. Their articles heralded what would be a 
fifteen-year fight in Congress and the states, led by Professor 
B ~ r c h a r d ~ ~  with the strong support of the organized bar,94 to win 
90. The declaratory judgment's origins have been traced to ancient Roman law. 
Borchard, The Declorotary Judgment-A Needed Procedural Reform, Port I ,  28 YALE 
L.J. 1, 12-14 (1918) [hereinafter Borchard, Part I ] .  With the reception of Roman law 
by early nation states in Europe, the declaratory judgment came to medieval France and 
Germany. Id. at 14-20. "The connecting link between the declaratory action of the 
Middle Ages and modem English law is to be found in the law of Scotland." Id. at 21. 
A reported opinion granted declaratory relief as early as 1541. Id. at 22. The modem 
declaratory judgment took root in Great Britain in the late 19th century. Id. at 25-29. 
By the time Congress considered the device, Professor Borchard was able to say that 
"[slo important has the procedure for a declaratory judgment become in England that 
approximately 60 percent of the equity cases have for decades been brought under that 
procedure." Borchard, The Supreme Court and the Declaratory Judgment, 14 A.B.A. J .  
633, 634-35 (1928) [hereinafter Borchard, Supreme Court]. 
91. When the first bill was introduced in Congress in 1919, S. 5304, 65th Cong., 3d 
Sess., 57 CONG. REC. 1080 (1919), no state had a declaratory judgment act, although 
New Jersey and Illinois had statutes that provided declaratory relief limited to the con- 
struction of wills and deeds. Borchard, Part I,  supra note 90, at 30. One congressman 
at the first hearing on the bill candidly acknowledged his "lack of familiarity with this 
subject." Hearings on H. R. 10143 Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 67th 
Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 25, at 8 (1922) [hereinafter 1922 House Hearings] (remarks of Rep. 
Graham). 
92. Borchard, Supreme Court, supra note 90; Borchard, The Declaratory Judg- 
ment-A Needed Procedural Reform, Part 11, 28 YALE L.J. 105 (1918) [hereinafter 
Borchard, Part I I ] ;  Sunderland, A Modern Evolution in Remedial Rights-The Declara- 
tory Judgment, 16 MICH. L. REV. 69 (1917). These were the first articles on the topic to 
appear in American legal literature. In fact, even in Great Britain, where the declara- 
tory judgment action was well known, very little was written about it. Aside from a 
brief article in 1849 on the Scottish declaratory judgment, Professor Sunderland's first 
article in 1917 was "the only monographic study on the subject in the English lan- 
guage." Borchard, Part I,  supra note 90, at 6 11.14. 
93. Professor Borchard was the leading force behind the American declaratory 
judgment. His writings were prodigious and are still unsurpassed. In addition to the 
articles already mentioned, supra notes 63, 90, 92, his efforts include the following: 
Borchard, Declaratory Judgments in Pennsylvania, 82 U .  PA. L. REV. 317 (1934); 
Borchard, Judicial Relief for Peril and Insecurity, 45 HARV. L. REV. 793 (1932) [here- 
inafter Dorchard, Judicial Relief]; Rorchard & Morrison, Declaratory Judgments in 
Yew Jersey. 1 MERCER EASLEY L. REV. 1 (1932); Borchard, The Constitutiot~r~lit~. r! / '  
1)~~c~lorutory  judgment.^, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 561 (193 1) [hereinafter I\orch:~rc!. ( - . ' ! r : i i -  
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passage of acts authorizing declaratory judgments.95 Their.argu- 
ments were highly influential in persuading Congress to pass the 
Declaratory Judgment Act.96 
Early advocates of the declaratory judgment mountkd a blister- 
ing attack on the common law system's almost exclusive limitation 
of jurisdiction to cases seeking damage awards and injunctions. 
They claimed these remedies were inadequate in an increasingly 
complex society.97 A litigation system limited to those remedies 
was inevitably expensive, cumbersome, and fraught with uncer- 
tutionality]; Borchard, The Declaratory Judgment in the United States, 37 W. V A .  L.Q. 
127 (1931); Borchard, Declaratory Judgments, 3 U. CIN. L. REV. 24 (1929). In addition 
to his voluminous writings, he spoke often on the subject and testified before Congress 
on behalf of the federal Act. Both federal and state courts have referred to him as the 
father of the declaratory judgment in the United States. See, e.g., United States Fidelity 
& Guar. Co. v. Koch, 102 F.2d 288, 290 (3d Cir. 1939); Panama Processes, S.A. v. 
Cities Sem. Co., 362 F. Supp. 735, 738 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd, 496 F.2d 533 (2d Cir. 
1974); Mayor of El Dorado v. El Dorado Broadcasting Co., 260 Ark. 821, 837, 544 
S.W.2d 206, 214 (1976) (Fogleman, J., dissenting); Lloyd v. Campbell, 23 Ohio Op. 2d 
329, 336, 189 N.E.2d 660,669 (Mun. Ct. 1963), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 120 Ohio 
App. 441, 196 N.E.2d 786 (1964); see also Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 468 n.18 
(1974) (describing Borchard as "a principal proponent and author" of the Act). 
94. As early as 1919, the American Bar Association called the Declaratory Judg- 
ment Act "[tlhe most important legislation of the year affecting the administration of 
justice." 44 A.B.A. REP. 284 (1919). The Association was a strong advocate for the 
measure. Association leaders testified at each of the congressional hearings. See Hear- 
ings on H.R. 5623 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 70th 
Cong., 1st Sess., at 2-9 (1928) [hereinafter 1928 Senate Hearings] (testimony of Charles 
P. Taft, Chairman of the American Bar Association Committee on Jurisprudence and 
Law Reform); Hearings on H.R. 5365 Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 69th 
Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 12, at 2-8 (1926) [hereinafter 1926 House Hearings] (testimony of 
Nathan William MacChesney); 1922 House Hearings, supra note 91, at 3-17 (testimony 
of Henry W. Taft and Nathan W. MacChesney). 
95. The early proponents of declaratory judgments portrayed them primarily as 
beneficial extensions of additional jurisdiction to permit judicial resolution of disputes 
that could not be resolved using traditional common law remedies. See supra notes 
12-13 and accompanying text. 
96. See, e.g., C. WRIGHT, supra note 10, at 670 ("Much of the credit for [declara- 
tory judgment laws] . . . is due to Professors Edwin Borchard, of Yale, and Edson 
Sunderland, of Michigan, who crusaded for more than 30 years for a uniform state and 
federal declaratory relief procedure.") (footnote omitted). 
97. Borchard offered several reasons for the inadequacy of traditional remedies. 
Borchard, Declaratory Judgments, in 5 ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR LECTURES ON 
LEGAL TOPICS 243, 245 (1928). Damages are often inadequate because that relief can 
only be given "after the commission of a wrong." Borchard, Part I, supra note 90, at 3. 
Because "the social equilibrium is disturbed, not merely by a violation of private rights, 
but by placing them in a position of grave doubt and uncertainty, . . . the meaning of 
contracts and other written instruments can not be left in serious doubt without inter- 
ference with business and socia1,peace." Borchard, Declaratory Judgments, supra, at 
245. Injunctive relief also provided little help for the stabilization of business relations 
because "the injunction will be issued but rarely to restrain a breach .of contr:ict I>r ;a 
trespass." Borchard, Part I, supra note 90, at 3. Finally "hostile actioli[s) f c i l .  L ! ; I I I I : ! ~ C I .  
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 taint^.^^ Reformers argued that social equilibrium can be disturbed 
not only by direct violations of rights, but also by actions that leave 
persons in "grave doubt and ~ncer ta in ty"~~ about their legal posi- 
tions. In their view, the existing remedial structure failed in three 
ways. First, it failed to address the plight of a person embroiled in a 
dispute who, limited by traditional remedies, could not have the 
controversy adjudicated because the opposing party had the sole 
claim to traditional relief and chose not to use it.loo Second, the 
traditional system of remedies harmed parties by forcing them to 
wait an unnecessarily long time before seeking relief.lol Third, the 
reformers criticized the harshness of damage and injunctive awards. 
or an injunction" are unnecessary and cumbersome. Id. at 7; see also Sunderland, supra 
note 92, at 70, 76, 77. 
98. Borchard, Part I, supra note 90, at 1-3; Sunderland, supra note 92, at 77. 
99. Borchard, Part I, supra note 90, at 2. Without provision for the declaratory 
judgment action, Borchard argued the traditional remedies of the common law system 
left a litigant prey to a "variety of doubt, dilemmas, and uncertainties." Borchard, Judi- 
cial Relief, supra note 93, at 854. 
100. The early reformers gave many illustrations of the harm that was done to per- 
sons who fell into this category. A common example is an alleged debtor who wishes to 
establish the nonexistence of any debt owed the person who claims to be a creditor. If 
the creditor does not bring suit, the alleged debtor is left in a state of uncertainty that 
can be extremely harmful. Borchard, Part I, supra note 90, at 8-10. 
101. A common example of this kind of situation is the case of a building contractor 
who has a multimillion dollar contract to build a skyscraper using the "highest grade" 
materials. If a dispute arises with a client prior to construction concerning whether the 
materials the builder proposes to use in constructing the building are of the highest 
quality, at common law, absent the declaratory judgment procedure, no remedy existed 
because no breach of the contract had yet occurred. Absent the availability of declara- 
tory relief, "[tlhe common law principle well established and for the most part adhered 
to for centuries is that no one may invoke the aid of the court until he has suffered loss 
or damage or until his rights are invaded and loss or damage presently threatened." 
Gordon, The Law of Declaratory Judgments and Its Progress, 9 V A .  L. REV. 169 (1923). 
Without a legal remedy, the builder's options are not promising. He can use the 
material he chose, but only at risk that a court will later determine that the material did 
not conform to the contract. Alternatively, the builder can refuse to construct the facil- 
ity until the dispute is resolved, but this may trigger a suit for nonperformance. The 
builder's third alternative, and one that the declaratory judgment advocates argued 
might be forced upon him by the limitation of his remedies, is to accept his client's 
interpretation of the contract, forgo his plan to use the material of choice, and sustain 
the economic loss entailed by this decision. In short, "[iln the absence of the rleclara- 
tory judgment the only alternative of either party is to yield to the other's claim or to 
refuse to comply with the provisions of the contract at the risk of a liability for damages 
for breach." Dunn, The Declaratoty Judgment, 45 A.B.A. REP.  383, 388 (1920). The 
advocates lamented this result as wasteful and unworthy of an advanced system of jus- 
tice. Borchard, Port It,  supra note 92, at 131 (given "the modern economic world, in 
which contracts constitute the normal instrument of business relations." the ahsctice of 
;I procedure for construction of a contract in advance of hreach is a "crudity"). S~rnc!ct.- 
I .11 i t1 ,  suprtl note 92, ;it 81-82, 
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Even when they could be invoked, they were thought to hamper 
litigants who did not need or desire coercive relief.lo2 
For the reformers, the declaratory judgment was the proce- 
dural innovation that would solve these problems. It could be in- 
voked regardless whether the person bringing it had a claim at 
common law.103 A declaratory judgment would address the 
problems by serving as a remedy: (1) for parties who could not 
have their controversies judicially reviewed because the opposing 
parties held the traditional claim and had not yet commenced suit, 
(2) for parties who did not yet have a remedy because their contro- 
versies under traditional principles were genuine but not yet justici- 
able, and (3) for parties not desiring available traditional relief.lo4 
To achieve these goals, the reformers proposed a remedy that was 
forthrightly forum-expanding in two ways. First, it gave a right of 
action to a person involved in a genuine dispute with a party who 
could sue, but for some reason refused to do so. The reformers ac- 
knowledged that this expansion of jurisdiction, which was accom- 
plished by a dramatic role reversal from the traditional common 
law casting of parties, was previously unknown. Indeed, a new 
term had to be coined to describe such a case. Professor Borchard 
named this use of the declaratory judgment a "negative declara- 
tion."lo5 Professor Trautman has called the jurisdictional innova- 
tion created by permitting either party to a dispute to come into 
102. Both Borchard and Sunderland pictured the social order as much more-ad- 
vanced than the legal system allowed. They saw a modem world in which parties were 
prepared to obey the pronouncements of courts without further intervention. "The 
more highly organized a society becomes, the less occasion there is to display force in 
order to secure obedience to its decrees and adjudications. . . . The mere authoritative 
declaration of the reciprocal rights and obligations of the parties suffices to insure obedi- 
ence." E. BORCHARD, supra note 63, at  12-13; see also Sunderland, supra note 92, at  
70. Therefore, the declaratory judgment would serve as a potential substitute for tradi- 
tional remedies, even if the party seeking the declaration could have sought more coer- 
cive remedies. It  would no longer be necessary to "shake the mailed fist of the State in 
the faces of the litigants." Id. at 69. 
103. Note, Developments in the Law: Declaratory Judgments, 62 HARV. L. REV. 
787, 789 (1949); see also E. BORCHARD, supra note 63, at 26. 
104. See generally Borchard, Part I,  supra note 90; Sunderland, supra note 92. 
105. Borchard, Part I, supra note 90, at 8. Two of the three categories of cases 
Justice Frankfurter excluded, the mirror-image case and the federal-defense case, are 
negative declaration cases. See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text. 
English courts initially resisted this use of the declaratory judgment largely on the 
ground that this kind of relief was outside their jurisdiction. Not until Guaranty Trust 
Co. v. Hannay & Co., [I9151 2 K.B. 536, could the plaintiff ask the court to declare "no 
right" of the defendant or the "privilege or immunity of the plaintiff." Borchard, Purr I, 
supra note 90, at 27. Before that case, English courts had limited their jurisdiction nver 
declaratory judgment cases to situations in which the plaintiff could have sought coer- 
ctve relief. Id. at 27-28. Thus, for vastly different mtio~iales, the British courts i t~ i t i ;~ l ly  
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court "the most striking [feature] of the declaratory remedy."lo6 
This change in the "forensic position of the litigants"l07 provides 
what commentators have frankly labeled "a new cause of ac- 
tion."lo8 The Supreme Court's failure to recognize this innovation 
has given rise to most of the federal question jurisdiction problems 
posed by declaratory judgment actions. 
But what was seen as the most controversial, forum-expanding 
attribute of the declaratory judgment action does not involve federal 
question jurisdiction problems. It arose from providing jurisdiction 
to determine a claim sooner than is possible using traditional reme- 
dies.lo9 Since the framers of the modem declaratory judgment ac- 
tion recognized that harm can often occur before "the plaintiff's 
rights have been invaded,"l1° they proposed giving courts jurisdic- 
tion to hear cases without the need for a formal violation of right, so 
long as a genuine dispute existed. 111 
Although the legal community appreciated the need for declar- 
atory judgments, and agreed with the arguments of the reformers, 
the jurisdictional extension necessitated by advancing the timing of 
suits troubled many, including the United States Supreme Court. 
From 1919, when a federal declaratory judgment act was first seri- 
ously proposed, to 1934, when it finally was passed, the courts 
struggled with this jurisdictional problem. That fight had a signifi- 
cant impact on Congress's deliberations. Indeed, one cannot under- 
stand the congressional debates about the jurisdictional limitations 
of the declaratory judgment without considering this aspect of its 
history. 
B. The Judicial Battle for Recognition of the Declaratory 
Judgment 
Given the novelty of the declaratory judgment and its prospec- 
tive impact upon the courts, the judiciary did not warmly embrace 
took the same position on jurisdiction over declaratory judgment cases that Justice 
Frankfurter later took in Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 167 (1950). 
106. Trautman, supra note 19, at 463. 
107. E. BORCHARD, supra note 63, at 233. 
108. Note, supra note 103, at 789 n.14 (citing C. CLARK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW 
OF CODE PLEADING 137 (2d. ed. 1947)). Some courts have also recognized this. See 
infra note 227. 
109. See infro notes 112-47 and accompanying text for discussion of that 
controversy. 
110. Trautman, supra note 19, at 463. 
1 1  1 .  13orchard. Parr 11, supra note 92, at 109; Sunderland, supra note 92. at 173-71. 
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it.l12 The accelerated timing troubled some courts, which saw the 
device thrusting the judiciary into areas beyond its constitutional 
power. The national debate on this topic, triggered by decisions of 
state and federal courts, swirled around the Congresses that consid- 
ered the federal act and heavily influenced their deliberations. Since 
Justice Frankfurter later implied a congressional intent to limit the 
declaratory judgment's effect on jurisdiction, it is important to un- 
derstand how the judiciary struggled with the jurisdiction-ex- 
panding nature of the declaratory judgment. 
Four cases occupied center stage in the debate, one state 
supreme court case and a trilogy of opinions by the United States 
Supreme Court.l13 Those cases focused on the declaratory judg- 
ment action's acceleration of assertion of claims. l4  With some suc- 
cess, opponents argued that litigants bringing declaratory judgment 
actions would present moot or advisory cases to unsuspecting 
courts. Justice Frankfurter's failure to appreciate the nature of 
this jurisdictional debate is largely responsible for the difficulties 
caused by the Supreme Court's treatment of declaratory judgment 
cases. 
1. The Anway Decision 
Anway v. Grand Rapids Railway 116 was the first case to con- 
sider the declaratory judgment's con~titutionality.~~ A railroad 
conductor wishing to work long hours brought a friendly action 
against his employer for a declaration that a state labor law limiting 
working hours was uncon~titutional.~~~ However, no one had 
112. "It i s .  . . not surprising that a new remedy . . . should have aroused hostility in 
some courts whose judges . . . had not heard the term 'declaratory judgments' . . . in 
their student days." Borchard, Declaratory Judgments & Insurance Litigation, reprinted 
in AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION OF INSURANCE LAW 74 (1938) (address by 
Professor Borchard, July 26, 1938) [hereinafter Borchard Address]. 
113. Willing v. Chicago Auditorium Assoc., 277 U.S. 274 (1928); Liberty Ware- 
house Co. v. Burley, 276 U.S. 71 (1928); Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Grannis, 273 U.S. 70 
(1927); Anway v. Grand Rapids Ry., 211 Mich. 592, 179 N.W. 350 (1920). 
114. See infra notes 119, 131, 143, and accompanying text. 
115. See infra note 123 and accompanying text. The declaratory judgment's sup- 
porters disclaimed any such intention. See id. 
116. 21 1 Mich. at 592, 179 N.W. at 350. 
117. When Congress first considered a declaratory judgment act, Wisconsin, Flor- 
ida, and Michigan had already passed their own acts. 1919 Fla. Laws 7857; 1919 Mich. 
Pub. Acts 150: 1919 Wis. Laws 242. Four other states, Connecticut, Maryland, New 
Jersey, and Rhode Island, had limited and "narrow statutes granting a limited power of 
rendering declaratory judgments." Borchard, Constitutionality. supra note 93, at 562. 
118. The defendant company's admission of the allegations of plaintiff's complaint 
rlcrnonstrates the cooperative nature of the suit. 2 l l Mich. at 593. 179 N.W. nt 151. 
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threatened to enforce the law.l19 The Michigan Supreme Court re- 
acted harshly to what it saw as the frightening implications of a 
procedure permitting such a suit. The zealous claims of the early 
reformers also made an "unfortunate" impression. 120 For example, 
Professor Sunderland titled his first article The Courts as Authorized 
Legal Advisors of the People.121 The court held the Act unconstitu- 
tional because it permitted "determinations of abstract propositions 
Part of the problem was that neither the railroad labor union nor the state were parties 
to the action, even though they had the most to lose by an adverse decision. However, 
the court allowed the union to intervene and invited the state attorney general to file an 
amicus brief. 211 Mich. at 593, 595, 179 N.W. at 351-52. Advocates of the declaratory 
judgment labeled the facts of Anway "inexpressibly unfortunate" for the first test case in 
the United States of the new declaratory judgment acts. E. BORCHARD, eclaratory 
Judgments, supra note 97, at 262; 1928 Senate Hearings, supra note 94, at 22 (testimony 
of Prof. Sunderland). Evidently, a more favorable case was working its way up at the 
time, and supporters later opined that the story might have been different if it had been 
decided first. E. BORCHARD, supra note 63, at 264, 1928 Senate Hearings, supra note 
94, at 22. 
119. 21 1 Mich. at 593-94, 179 N.W. at 351. Nothing on the face of the Act seemed 
to prohibit a suit in this posture. Unlike subsequent declaratory judgment acts, which 
limit the action to cases within a court's power, see infra notes 124-27 and accompany- 
ing text, the Michigan Act provided without express limitation that "[no] action or 
proceeding in any court of record shall be open to objection on the ground that a merely 
[sic] declaratory judgment . . . is sought." 1919 Mich. Pub. Acts 150, 5 1. 
120. E. BORCHARD, supra note 63, at 153. 
121. Sunderland, The Courts as Authorized Legal Advisors of the People, 54 AM. L. 
REV. 161 (1920). Professor Sunderland's views were the high water mark of advocates' 
claims for the declaratory judgment. He argued that the time had come to recognize a 
"new rule authorizing declaratory judgments . . . [that] gives one the right to know what 
his rights are." Id. at 174. The declaratory judgment would effectuate that right, open- 
ing new possibilities for the courts to serve as "oracle[s]" to advise people. Courts, 
rather than serving as "repair shops" for people who fell into legal difficulties, could 
become "service stations." Id. Sunderland challenged courts to adopt this "revolution- 
ized . . . remedial law" which would transform them from being only "the nemesis of 
wrongdoers" to "become the guardians and advisers of those who respect the law." Id. 
After Anway, no such extravagant claims were made. 
Sunderland's views did not fare well in the Michigan Supreme Court. Although it 
referred to him as "one of the professors of one of the country's great universities," 21 1 
Mich. at 596, 179 N.W. at 352, the court all but branded him a communist for advocat- 
ing the benefits of the declaratory judgment. The court characterized his arguments as 
advancing the view that 
it is the duty of the State through its courts to furnish advice to its citi- 
zens. . . . This adopts the view that 'the state is everything, the individual 
nothing.' Under our government the State does not till our farms . . . or 
do our law business for us. The unfortunate people of one country are at 
present trying such experiment in government. We [, however,] are still a 
government of laws, operating under a written Constitution. 
21 1 Mich. at 597, 179 N.W. at 352. 
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of law,"122 and therefore conferred nonjudicial power on the 
courts. '23 
The Michigan court's lengthy and scathing rejection dealt a 
"serious blow to the movement" for declaratory judgments in the 
United States.124 The legal'community was forced to reexamine the 
new device's ~onstitutiona1ity.l~~ Proponents recognized that with- 
out explicit jurisdictional limitations, any new act was in danger. In 
1922, therefore, the Uniform Commissioners on State Laws 
amended a proposed Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act to author- 
ize only cases already within the courts' "respective jurisdic- 
t i o n ~ . " ' ~ ~  This amendment was intended to signal what the drafters 
122. 211 Mich. at 605, 179 N.W. at 355. 
123. Id. at 622, 179 N.W. at 361. Contemporary commentators thought the Anway 
court's analysis was critically flawed by its failure to distinguish between declaratory 
judgment actions presenting independently justiciable controversies, which the Act con- 
templated, and those raising advisory or moot questions, which it did not. E. 
BORCHARD, supra note 63, at 152-55 (citations omitted). The Anway court's quarrel 
with the Act, however, is more basic than that. One can read the opinion as expressing 
the court's disagreement with a central premise of the declaratory judgment's advo- 
cates: that a dispute can be justiciable before "any wrong has been committed, or before 
any damages have been occasioned." 211 Mich. at 605, 179 N.W. at 355. The United 
States Supreme Court appears later to have expressed a similar point of view. See infra 
notes 137-46 and accompanying text for a discussion of those cases. 
124. Borchard, Declaratory Judgments, supra note 97, at 264,1928 Senate Hearings, 
supra note 94, at 22 (testimony of Prof. Sunderland) ("That Anway case . . . has caused, 
I suppose, most of the trouble we have had in this country in regard to declaratory 
judgment acts."). 
125. Pressure came from quarters other than the courts. The Wisconsin Attorney 
General or the Governor seems to have heard of Anway and "asked the legislature to 
repeal the declaratory judgment statute, because he believed that it was unconstitu- 
tional." Borchard, Declaratory Judgments, supra note 97, at 266 (emphasis in original). 
After the legislature complied and subsequently passed a new act that attempted to 
address the problem, the Governor vetoed it, stating that "[a]ctions seeking declaratory 
relief are, after all, nothing more than moot actions." Id. at 267. 
126. Final Draft of a Bill for an Act Concerning Declaratory Judgments and De- 
crees, HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM 
STATE LAWS 241 (1922). 
The draft of the Act approved by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 
1920, before Anway, contained no limitation of this nature. First Tentative Draft of an 
Act Relating to Declaratory Judgments and Decrees, HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL 
CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 188 (1920). After 
Anway, some Commission members became fearful that the Act was "unconstitutional, 
null and void," and that without this amendment the Commissioners might "put a 
damper forever upon the great progressive movement of declaratory judgments." 
HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM 
STATE LAWS 81-82 (1921). 
Professor Borchard supported this amendment "[tlo avoid any possibility of doubt 
of the function to be performed by a declaratory judgment," although he continued to 
insist that the amendment was "surplusage," since the Act was always intended to be 
limited to cases of actual controversy. E. BORCHARD, supra note 63, at 154-55. 
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thought apparent: the declaratory judgment is not designed to per- 
mit adjudication of moot cases or rendition of advisory opinions. 
Supporters also amended the federal act to conform to Anway.12' 
Nevertheless, doubts about declaratory judgments persisted and 
peaked in three United States Supreme Court opinions. These cases 
played an important role in the congressional debate by raising the 
question of whether the proposed federal act, even as amended, 
overstepped the bounds of article 111. 
2. The Supreme Court's Trilogy 
The Court quickly went out of its way to disparage declaratory 
judgments on case-or-controversy grounds.128 In Liberty Ware- 
house Co. v. Grannis (Liberty Warehouse I),129 a tobacco ware- 
houseman brought a declaratory judgment action in federal court 
against the Kentucky Attorney General, claiming that a new state 
law regulating warehouses was unconstitutional. The plaintiff relied 
upon the Kentucky declaratory judgment act as applicable under 
the federal Conformity Act, which required federal courts to follow 
state procedural laws in diversity actions.130 The Supreme Court 
affirmed dismissal of the complaint on two grounds. First, the com- 
monwealth's attorney had not threatened to enforce the Warehouse 
Act,131 so the plaintiff's claim was considered too abstract for adju- 
127. To alleviate the problem involved in Anway (the lack of a justiciable contro- 
versy), the words "[iln cases of actual controversy" were included in the first bill to pass 
the House of Representatives. See H.R. 5365, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., 67 CONG. REC. 
9546 (1926). 
128. Declaratory judgment advocates considered the remarks in all three of the 
cases to be dicta. Borchard, Supreme Court, supra note 90, at 635-40, 1928 Senate 
Hearings, supra note 94, at 17, 22-27 (testimony of Profs. Borchard and Sunderland). 
But dicta or not, those decisions were formidable to thoughtful legislators in the years 
that the federal Declaratory Judgment Act was considered by Congress. 
129. 273 U.S. 70 (1927). 
130. 17 Stat. 196, 197 (1872), amended as 28 U.S.C.A. 9 724 (West 1926). The 
Conformity Act provided, in pertinent part: 
[Tlhe practice, pleadings, and forms and modes of proceeding in [civil 
causes], other than equity and admiralty causes in the circuit and district 
courts of the United States shall conform, as near as may be, to the prac- 
tice, pleadings, and forms, and modes of proceeding existing at the time 
in like causes in the courts of record of the State within which such cir- 
cuit or district courts are held, any rule of court to the contrary notwith- 
standing . . . . 
Id. 
131. The Court's opinion on this point may have been factually incorrect. At the 
1928 Senate Hearing, Professor Borchard told the Subcommittee: "The fact was, how- 
ever, as I discovered later, that the Attorney General of the State had contested the 
action and had undertaken to indict the plaintiff, but that does not appear in Judge 
Heinonline - -  36 UCLA L. Rev. 558 1988-1989 
19891 DECLARATOR Y JUDGMENT ACT 559 
d i ~ a t i 0 n . I ~ ~  Second, the state's declaratory judgment act was more 
than a mere item of practice and procedure and therefore the Con- 
formity Act did not contemplate it. The Court stated that a federal 
court could not grant declaratory relief under the Conformity Act 
since the Act "neither purports to nor can extend the jurisdiction of 
the district courts beyond the constitutional limitations."133 
The second case, Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Burley (Liberty 
Warehouse 11),134 was a state court enforcement proceeding 
brought under the same warehouse act. The defendant warehouse- 
man counterclaimed for a declaration that the Act was unconstitu- 
tional, but the state court struck the counterclaim on the ground 
that only a plaintiff could seek a declaration under Kentucky's de- 
claratory judgment act.135 The Supreme Court affirmed, saying the 
ruling did not deny the defendants due process.136 The case would 
not have been terribly damaging to the movement for declaratory 
judgments, except that Justice McReynolds added the following 
cryptic sentence: "This court has no jurisdiction to review a mere 
declaratory j~dgrnent.""~ 
The final decision in the trilogy was Willing v. Chicago Audito- 
rium A~socia t ion .~~~ The long term lessee-operator of the Chicago 
Auditorium wished to tear down the existing structure to build a 
large commercial building, but the lease did not specifically author- 
ize it to do so. After fruitless negotiations with the lessors, the 
lessee sued in state court for a declaration to resolve the q ~ e s t i 0 n . l ~ ~  
The defendants removed the action to federal court and moved to 
dismiss.140 On review, the Supreme Court held that the case should 
Sanford's opinion, and it is not a fact that he assumed." 1928 Senate Hearings, supra 
note 94, at 17. 
132. 273 U.S. 70passim. 
133. ~ d .  at 76. 
134. 276 U.S. 71 (1928). 
135. Id. at 88. 
136. Id. at 88-89. The Court also deferred to the state court's interpretation of 
Kentucky's declaratory judgment act. Id. at 88. 
137. Id. at 89. The Court cited only Liberty Warehouse I as authority for this far- 
reaching statement. 
138. 277 U.S. 274 (1928). 
139. The case was originally brought by the plaintiffs in state court to remove a 
cloud on title to the lease. Some of the defendants who were out-of-state residents had 
the case removed to federal court. They claimed that the controversy as to'them was 
"separable" and therefore could be heard by the federal courts as a diversity case. They 
then moved to dismiss the case. Id. at 283-84. 
140. The defendants argued that, under Illinois law, the action to remove title did 
not lie and that the federal court lacked jurisdiction to provide alternative relief which, 
if granted, would have to take the form of a declaratory judgment. Id. at 288-89. 
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have been dismissed because the facts did not present "a case or 
controversy within the meaning of article III."141 
Justice Brandeis explained that the lessee's claim of the lessors' 
opposition was little more than conjecture. "Several of the lessors 
were never approached"142 for their permission for the lessee to de- 
molish the old facility. The only opposition had been expressed 
"[iln the course of an informal, friendly, private conversation."143 
But Brandeis did not rest his opinion on this narrow ground alone. 
In language that Justice Stone criticized with some irony as declara- 
tory itself,144 Brandeis suggested that the declaratory judgment 
remedy exceeded the limits of judicial power. Even though he ac- 
knowledged that the case before him was not moot, that the parties 
were adverse, that the plaintiff had a substantial, definite and spe- 
cific interest in the question sought to be adjudicated, and that the 
question presented was not abstract, Brandeis remained 
unsatisfied. 145 
The trilogy, coming at a time of renewed congressional interest 
in declaratory judgments, was a serious setback for its ad~0ca tes . l~~  
Indeed, it interposed a virtual judicial veto of the Act that lasted 
until the Supreme Court reversed course five years later.14' But it is 
important to remember that the trilogy reflected only the fear that 
the Act would sanction suits unauthorized by the case-or-contro- 
versy limitation; the trilogy in no respect concerned a potential ex- 
pansion of statutory federal question jurisdiction. This distinction 
is critical to a proper understanding of the cases' effect on congres- 
sional deliberations. Specific consideration of the Act's legislative 
141. Id. at 289. 
142. Id. at 286. 
143. Id. 
144. Id. at 291 (Stone, J., concurring). 
145. Id. at 289. "What the plaintiff seeks is simply a declaratory judgment. To 
grant that relief is beyond the power conferred upon the federal judiciary." Id. 
146. Of the cases in the trilogy, Willing, because of its author, its facts (which 
presented the most appealing case of the trilogy for a declaratory judgment), and its 
timing (just after the Senate's first and only hearings on the subject) was the most "seri- 
ous in its possibility of harm to the proposed federal legislation." Borchard, Supreme 
Court, supra note 90, at 635. For a discussion of the devastating impact of the trilogy on 
the Act's chances for passage in Congress, see infra notes 170-77 and accompanying 
text. 
147. See infra notes 177-82 and accompanying text. The state courts reversed 
course earlier. A year after Anway, the Kansas Supreme Court upheld the constitution- 
ality of a revised declaratory judgment act. State ex rel. Hopkins v. Grove, 109 Kan. 
619, 201 P. 82 (1921). "The Kansas decision in the Grove case became the beacon for 
all subsequent state cases dealing with the constitutionality of the declaratory judg- 
ment." E. BORCHARD, supra note 63, at 157. By the time of the Supreme Court's tril- 
ogy, eight state supreme courts had upheld declaratory judgment acts. Id. at 157-63. 
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history reveals that Congress resolved to permit broader statutory 
federal question jurisdiction in declaratory judgment cases than the 
Court later allowed. At the same time, it imposed a jurisdictional 
limitation to keep the Act within the limits of article 111. 
C .  The Legislative History of the Federal Declaratory Judgment 
Act of 1934 
The first attempt to pass a federal act quickly followed 
Borchard's and Sunderland's ground-breaking articles. The bill was 
introduced in every session of Congress from 1919 to 1932. It 
passed the House three times,14* but the Senate refused to con- 
Finally, in 1934, the Act became law.150 
Although the Congress that passed the Act did so without any 
hearings and with virtually no di~cussion,~~'  three hearings on ear- 
lier proposals for a declaratory judgment law were held in the 
1 9 2 0 ~ . ' ~ ~  These hearings, together with the discussions on the floor 
of Congress over the years that the concept was before it, give a 
rather full record of congressional deliberations on this subject. 
148. It passed the House in 1926, 1928, and 1932. H.R. 4624,75th Cong., 2d Sess., 
76 CONG. REC. 698 (1932); H.R. 5623,70th Cong., 1st Sess., 69 CONG. REC. 2025,2032 
(1928); H.R. 5365, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., 67 CONG. REC. 9546 (1926). Unable to win 
acceptance of the concept in Congress, the reformers turned their attention to the states. 
By 1920, three states had passed an act. See supra note 117. Thereafter, "the move- 
ment for more extensive declaratory relief. . . spread rapidly." Note, supro note 103, at 
791. In 1922, the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws proposed a uniform act for 
passage by the states. See supro note 126 and accompanying text. When the Senate 
held hearings in 1928 on the federal measure, 23 states already had passed a declaratory 
judgment act. Borchard, Supreme Court, supra note 90, at 633. By 1934, when the 
federal act finally passed, a majority of the states had a declaratory judgment act. 78 
CONG. REC. 8224 (1934) (remarks of Rep. Montague). The majority of remaining 
states quickly followed after Congress acted. By 1949, only Arkansas, Louisiana, Mis- 
sissippi, and Oklahoma were without a declaratory judgment act. Note, supro note 103, 
at 791 & n.39. 
149. See infro note 172 and accompanying text for a discussion of why the Senate 
may not have acted favorably. 
150. Act of June 14, 1934, ch. 512, 48 Stat. 955 (current version at 28 U.S.C. 
$8 2201-2202 (1982)). 
151. There were no debates or hearings held in either the House or the Senate on the 
1934 Bill. The consideration by each chamber was limited to a brief summary of the 
Bill by its sponsors, followed by a voice vote. 78 CONG. REC. 10564-65, 10919 (1934) 
(consideration of the Bill by the Senate); 78 CONG. REC. 8224 (1934)(consideration of 
the Bill by the House). 
152. See supro notes 91-94 and accompanying text. It is common for a court to rely 
on hearings conducted in Congresses prior to the session in which the statute was en- 
acted. See, e.g., Arizona Power Auth. v. Morton, 549 F.2d 1231 (9th Cir.), cert. denied 
sub nom. Arizona Power Auth. v. Andrus, 434 U.S. 835 (1977); Wilderness Soc'y v. 
Morton, 479 F.2d 842, 856 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 41 1 U.S. 917 (1973) ("The legisla- 
tive history of the bill that was finally enacted into law . . . contains no discussion [of the 
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That record has not been extensively explored,153 but it shows that 
Congress.intended to expand the subject matter jurisdiction of the 
federal courts to reap the benefits of the declaratory judgment ac- 
tion, and that it sought to prevent. use of the device only by parties 
presenting moot or advisory claims. 
1. What Congress Wanted the Act to Do 
Congress knew the benefits of declaratory judgments. Lawyers, 
scholars and Sudges testified that the Act would help eliminate the 
uncertainty in legal relations caused b y  the established remedies' 
inability to address genuine and pressing con t ro~ers i e s .~~~  Specifi- 
cally, Congress knew that the Act would permit parties otherwise 
unable to sue in federal court to use that forum.155 The bulk of 
issue]. . . . The legislative history of similar bills in prior Congresses, however, is very 
revealing."); Panella v. United States, 216 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1954). 
On at least one occasion, the Supreme Court used the legislative history from a 
prior statute to interpret a subsequent statute. In Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 
U.S. 144 (1963), the Court looked to the history of a predecessor statute to discern 
Congress's intention when it enacted the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 
despite a dissent asserting that "nothing is to be gained from the legislative history of a 
quite different law enacted by a quite different Congress." Id. at 204 (Stewart, J., 
dissenting).. . . 
153. See supra note 77. 
154. The idea that the declaratory judgment would aid citizens by eliminating intol- 
erable uncertainties in their legal and business relations is a major theme of the legisla- 
tive history of the Act. See, e.g., 1928 Senate Hearings, supra note 94, at 16 (letter from 
Judge Cardozo, then Chief Judge of the New York State Court of Appeals, endorsing 
the Act as "a useful expedient to litigants who would otherwise have acted at their peril, 
or at best would have been exposed to harrowing delay"), 34-35 (testimony of Professor 
Sunderland) (describing categories of cases in which, without the declaratory judgment, 
the parties must undergo great risks without knowledge of the parties' respective entitle- 
ments, and concluding that the declaratory judgment "removes all that peril"); 1926 
House Hearings, supra note 94, at 4 (testimony of Nathan MacChesney) ("The great 
distinction [of the declaratory judgment] is that it enables persons in advance of subject- 
ing themselves to a suit for damages, to determine what they ought to do."); 1922 House 
Hearings, supra note 91, at 7-8 (testimony of Henry Taft). Representative Gilbert's 
comment during floor debate is perhaps the most graphic statement of this benefit of the 
declaratory judgment: "Under the present law you take a step in the dark and then turn 
on the light to see if you stepped into a hole. Under the declaratory judgment law you 
turn on the light and then take the step." 69 CONG. REC. 2030 (1928). 
155. See, e.g., 1928 Senate Hearings, supm note 94, at 32 (testimony of Prof. Sunder- 
land); 1926 House Hearings, supra note 94, at 8 (testimony of Nathan MacChesney); 
1922 House Hearings, supra note 91, at 8 (testimony of Henry Taft) (The "great fea- 
ture" of the Act is thatit permits litigation when otherwise "a lawsuit can not possibly 
be maintained."); S. REP. NO. 1005, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1934) [hereinafter SEN- 
ATE REPORT]. 
By the time of the Senate hearings, a large number of states had declaratory judg- 
ment acts. See supra note 148. However, the Supreme Court ruled in Liberty Ware- 
house II that those acts would not grant entry to federal court through the Conformity 
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testimony and remarks, by advocates and opponents alike, focused 
on the Act's opening federal courts to cases that without the new 
remedy could not have been heard there.lS6 The legislative history 
of the Act is replete with references to cases of persons who could 
not "sue in a conventional action" because only their adversary had 
a traditional claim for relief. lS7 Representatives extolled the bene- 
fits of this use of the device.lS8 
While Congress heard lengthy discussion about the jurisdic- 
tion-expanding aspects of the Act, the testimony did not focus ex- 
tensively on the attributes of the Act that would extend federal 
question jurisdiction.lS9 The well-pleaded complaint rule,160 for ex- 
- -- 
Act. See supra notes 134-37 and accompanying text. Therefore, the testimony focused 
on providing a federal forum for parties who had already been accorded one in state 
court. See, e.g., 1928 Senate Hearings, supra note 94, at 14-17 (statements of Rep. 
Montague and Prof. Borchard). 
156. Virtually the entire discussion of the benefits of the proposed Act was devoted 
to situations in which the potential plaintiff would have been unable to sue without it, 
either because there had not yet been a violation of right or because the potential de- 
fendant was the only one who possessed a common law right of action. The sole cate- 
gory of federal question suit permitted by Justice Frankfurter's Skelly a n a l y s i ~ a s e s  
in which the declaratory judgment plaintiff already possessed an affirmative right of 
action-was described at the hearings as "not the usual way in which declaratory judg- 
ments are employed." 1928 Senate Hearings, supra note 94, at 21 (testimony.of Prof. 
Borchard). 
Congress recognized that the Act also provided for a milder alternative remedy for 
litigants who did not wish to inflict the bitter medicine of a damage award or an injunc- 
tion on their adversaries. See, e.g., 1928 Senate Hearings, supra note 94, at 21 (testi- 
mony of Prof. Borchard) ("[Tlhere is no reason why, if I trust another man, or if I do 
not want to incur the hostility of another man, I should not simply ask for a declaration 
that he owes me $500."). 
157. 1928 Senate Hearings, supm note 94, at 21. An annotation of sixty "typical" 
cases from state jurisdictions which had passed declaratory judgment acts was ap- 
pended to the record of the 1928 Senate Hearings. Id. at 47-59. The list was prepared 
to illustrate that the declaratory judgment act was most useful in situations "where 
people would otherwise have to act at their peril" because they had no remedy. Id. at 
-. 
L1. 
158. See, e.g., 71 CONG. REC. 10564-65 (1934) (remarks of Sen. King); 69 CONG. 
REC. 1687 (1928) (remarks of Rep. Celler); 66 CONG. REC. 4874 (1925) (remarks of 
Rep. Montague); see also SENATE REPORT, supra note 155, at 1-2. 
159. Most of the discussion and debate dealt with cases concerning issues of state 
law that would be raised in a federal action through the district court's diversity juris- 
diction. See, e.g., 1928 Senate Hearings, supra note 94, at 47-59 ("Typical declaratory 
judgment cases" include cases about "construction of written instruments," such as 
contracts, leases, deeds, articles of association, wills, mortgages, insurance policies, 
charter parties, and declarations of status; only two categories, status and challenges to 
the validity of government laws, present situations likely to give rise to federal question 
litigation.); 1926 House Hearings, supra note 94, at 3 (testimony of Nathan MacChes- 
ney); 1922 House Hearings, supm note 91, at 10 (testimony of Henry Taft) ("concrete 
cases" likely to be brought under the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act include right- 
of-way, title-to-personal-property, and breach-ofcontract cases). 
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ample, was never mentioned. However, witnesses discussed two of 
the three categories of federal question declaratory judgment cases 
Justice Frankfurter later excluded in Skelly : the mirror-image case 
and the federal-defense case.I6l That discussion shows Congress 
meant to extend jurisdiction beyond limitations subsequently im- 
posed by the Court. 
The discussion of the mirror-image federal question action is 
most revealing. Congress heard of the plight of alleged infringers of 
federally granted licenses who, without the declaratory judgment 
procedure, were unable to fend off the threats of license holders. 
Professor Sunderland testified that federal patent, trademark and 
copyright cases were prime examples of potential litigants who 
under then-current law were aggrieved but unable to bring their 
cases to federal court. Sunderland's explanation of the difficulties 
this presented sounds like a description of the facts in American 
Well Works : 162 
I assert that I have a right to use a certain patent. You 
claim that you have a patent. What am I going to do about it? 
There is no way that I can litigate my right, which I claim, to use 
that device, except by going ahead and using it, and you [the 
patent holder] can sit back as long as you please and let me run 
up just as high a bill of damages as you wish to have me run up, 
and then you may sue me for the damages, and I am ruined, 
having acted all the time in good faith and on my best judgment, 
but having no way in the world to find out whether I had a right 
to use that device or not.163 
In Sunderland's words, the "declaratory remedy removes all that 
peril" because it allows alleged patent infringers for the first time to 
sue directly in federal court.''j4 
Professor Borchard discussed the federal defense case. He 
noted a case in which a company engaged in interstate commerce 
contested a municipal ordinance that imposed a license fee on the 
sale of its products within the The law imposed criminal 
penalties for violations. The company attempted to challenge the 
constitutionality of the law, but the state court held an injunction 
160. See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text. 
161. The federal-reply case category exemplified by Skelly was not discussed in 
Congress. 
162. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text. 
163. 1928 Senate Hearings, supra note 94, at 35. 
164. Id. 
165. Id. at 18 (citing Shredded Wheat Co. v. City of Elgin, 284 Ill. 389, 120 N.E. 
248 (1918)). 
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would not lie against the enforcement of a penal statute.16'j Thus, 
the company could challenge the constitutionality of the law only 
by risking prosecution and raising the constitutional issue as a de- 
fense. Borchard testified that the declaratory judgment offered the 
advantage of permitting the company to initiate an action to adjudi- 
cate the constitutionality of the law without having to "violate it, or 
purport to violate it, in order to get a decision."167 Thus, Congress 
clearly knew that the declaratory judgment procedure allowed an 
action to assert a federal defense to an anticipated action by the 
opposing party. 168 
Neither the mirror-image case nor the federal-defense case 
could be brought without the declaratory judgment procedure, be- 
cause the plaintiff would lack a cause of action."j9 In the mirror- 
image case, the plaintiff would be asserting the invalidity of some- 
one else's federal claim, and in the federal-defense case, the plaintiff 
would be asserting the invalidity of another's state claim on federal 
grounds. Given the specific discussions in Congress of both types of 
cases in ways that would necessarily expand the district court's stat- 
utory federal question jurisdiction, it is difficult to credit Justice 
Frankfurter's statement that Congress did not view the declaratory 
judgment as forum-expanding. Nevertheless, the record of the fif- 
teen-year-long saga to win passage of the Act does raise serious con- 
cerns about the device's constitutional implications. The record 
includes suggestions that Congress meant the Act to apply only to 
cases already within the courts' article I11 jurisdiction. We must 
now examine whether this intention was directed toward limiting 
166. 1928 Senate Hearings, supra note 94, at 19. 
167. Id. Borchard contrasted this case with a similar action in a state that had 
adopted a declaratory judgment act. In that case, Erwin Billiard Parlor v. Buckner, 156 
Tenn. 278, 300 S.W. 565 (1927), a challenge to a municipal penal ordinance that prohib- 
ited billiard parlors in large cities was permitted. 
168. The Senate Report accompanying the Act that passed Congress cited Erwin 
Billiard Parlor with approval. The Report concluded that the use of the Act to attack 
the validity of laws before enforcement avoids "social and economic waste and destruc- 
tion [otherwise required] in order to obtain a determination of one's rights." SENATE 
REPORT, supra note 155, at 2; accord Borchard, The Federal Declaratory Judgments 
Act, 21 V A .  L. REV. 35, 49 (1934) [hereinafter Borchard, Federal Act] ("The greatest 
usefulness of the declaratory judgment in the federal jurisdiction will probably lie. . . in 
the testing of the statutory and administrative powers of officials under federal and state 
legislation . . ."). 
The Supreme Court had already entertained such an action and endorsed the ap- 
propriateness of the injunction procedure. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). 
Obviously the timing of such an action was not thought to present insurmountable case- 
or-controversy problems. 
169. See infra note 206 and accompanying text. 
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federal cases to the categories Justice Frankfurter described in 
Skelly. 
2. What Congress Wanted to Prevent 
Congressional misgivings about the jurisdictional reach of the 
proposed Act, expressed both on the floor and in committee hear- 
ings, related entirely to the article 111 justiciability questions dis- 
cussed in Anway and the Supreme Court's trilogy. The House 
hearings occurred after Anway, but before the Supreme Court ad- 
dressed the problem. The proponents endeavored to persuade Con- 
gress that moot or advisory adjudications were not ~ontemplated. '~~ 
The Senate hearing took place two years later, immediately af- 
ter both Liberty Warehouse cases and on the eve of Willing v. Chi- 
cago Auditorium Association. l7 ' Concern about the case-or- 
controversy problem had intensified. By the time of the hearing, 
the Senate had received the Supreme Court's warnings that a de- 
claratory judgment act would not be well received. That message 
had a jarring effect, and most of the testimony at the two-day hear- 
ing related to this issue. It was clear that Congress would not pass 
the Act unless it could be persuaded that the measure was not a 
- -- - -- - - 
170. One congressman captured the concern when he asked the major witness at the 
first hearing how the Act could authorize judicial action if a case were brought before a 
party that had the right to sue using conventional remedies. 1922 House Hearings, 
supra note 91, at 8 (remarks of Rep. Hersey). Mr. Taft replied: "Now you are raising a 
constitutional question which was determined adversely in the case of Michigan [refer- 
ring to Anway]. Personally, I think that the decision in Michigan was wrong." Id. (testi- 
mony of Henry Taft). Supporters of the Act tried to alleviate such concerns, stressing 
that the Act did not contemplate the adjudication of moot cases as Anway had warned it 
might. See, e.g., id. at 8 .  They also pointed out that a declaration would not lie without 
an "actual controversy." Id. at 15 (remarks of Merrill Moores). Language to that effect 
had been inserted into the proposed statute, the Committee was told, to meet the Anway 
problem. Id. at 3-12 (testimony of Henry Taft). The brief House hearings in 1926 also 
considered the article 111 jurisdictional problem. The first witness, Nathan MacChes- 
ney of the American Bar Association, asserted that the Bill had been amended to meet 
the "question [of mootness] that was raised in Michigan." 1926 House Hearings, supra 
note 94, at 2 (testimony of Nathan MacChesney). 
171. 277 U.S. 274 (1928). Although the hearing took place several days before Will- 
ing, the Senate Subcommittee was aware of it before deliberations ended. An article by 
Professor Borchard, discussing Willing at some length, is appended to the record of the 
hearing. 1928 Senate Hearings, supra note 94, at 70-81 (reprinting Borchard, Supreme 
Court, supra note 90). 
While there is no direct evidence supporting Justice Brandeis's timing of the deci- 
sion, it not unreasonable to think that he was aware that Willing might affect Congress's 
deliberations on the Declaratory Judgment Act. 
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legislative attempt to violate the constitutional limits established by 
article 111. But in 1928, Congress was not persuaded.172 
The same hesitancy in attributing jurisdictional significance to 
the proposed declaratory statute was not present when the witnesses 
and legislators examined its potential effects on the district court's 
statutory jurisdiction. Congress knew that the Act would expand 
the ways in which controversies of federal concern would come into 
court.173 But, unlike the strenuous debate that addressed the article 
I11 problem, here no one questioned the expansive effect of the act 
on the federal courts' j~risdicti0n.l~~ Indeed, one witness testified 
172. Even the supporters of the measure were not optimistic. The lead witness set 
the tone of the hearing, beginning his testimony with the concession that "ever since the 
bill was introduced we have had doubt as to its constitutionality." 1928 Senate Hear- 
ings, supra note 94, at 2 (testimony of Henry Taft). One member of the House appeared 
before the Subcommittee to present an impassioned argument against the Bill's constitu- 
tionality. Id. at 61-70 (testimony of Rep. Denison). He warned the legislators that 
"Congress can not, by any legislation it may enact, extend the jurisdiction of the [fed- 
eral courts] to take in anything other than 'cases and controversies.' " Id. at 64. All of 
the remaining witnesses, including Professors Borchard and Sunderland, discussed the 
significance of the jurisdictional hurdle to the Bill's passage presented by the Supreme 
Court's recent Liberty Warehouse opinions. Id. at 17, 22-29. While witnesses acknowl- 
edged that the Court's obvious article 111 concern about declaratory judgment actions 
created "a great deal of confusion," id. at 3, they argued that the cases did not foreclose 
passage, primarily on the ground that the Court had misunderstood the nature of the 
declaratory judgment. It was not meant, the witnesses said, to expand a district court's 
jurisdiction to reach advisory or moot cases. Id. at 18 (testimony of Prof. Borchard) 
(declaratory judgment is distinct from advisory opinion or moot case). The Court's 
intimation that the Declaratory Judgment Act permitted the adjudication of.non:article 
111 cases received heavy criticism at the hearing. Some said that these observations 
were pure dicta on an important matter that had not been briefed or argued. Id. at 26 
(testimony of Professor Sunderland) ("[Tlhis Liberty Warehouse case really raises two 
very simple questions, and does not deal at all with the principles of declaratory judg- 
ment acts."). Others pointed out that over 20 states had passed declaratory judgment 
acts and that, except for Michigan, all had been held constitutional. Id. at 6 (testimony 
of Charles Taft). 
Despite the arguments, one is left with a feeling that the supporters were merely 
playing out a losing hand. The atmosphere created by the Court's opinions was,such 
that even as vigorous and long-term an advocate of the Declaratory Judgment Act as 
Professor Sunderland conceded at the close of his testimony that it was "conceivable" 
that the Supreme Court would hold the Act unconstitutional. Id. at 28 (testimony of 
Prof. Sunderland). 
173. See supra notes 156-70 and accompanying text. 
174. Questions arose in Congress about the Act's caseload implications. See, e.g., 
1928 Senate Hearings, supra note 94, at 10-1 1 (letter of Dlstrict Judge Andrew Miller) 
("One patent result of this bill should it become a law . . . would be to greatly increase 
the congested dockets of the Federal Courts."). But Congress was unconvinced. In fact, 
because the Act was regarded as allowing parties to focus their litigation on the precise 
issues that separated them, Congress believed that, if anything, the Act would reduce 
court congestion. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 155, at 3 ("An important practical 
advantage of the declaratory judgment lies in the fact that i t  enables litigants to narrow 
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that the Act "enlarge[d] in a beneficial way . . . jurisdiction over a 
certain subject matter." 75 Moreover, Congress rejected language 
from an earlier draft restricting the availability of declaratory relief 
to suits that would have been within the court's jurisdiction without 
the That language would have supported Justice Frank- 
furter's position in Skelly. Its deletion strongly supports the idea 
that Congress did not intend to limit the Act's effect on statutory 
federal question cases. 
3. The Supreme Court's U-Turn and the Act's Passage 
The Court's hostility to the declaratory judgment on article I11 
grounds in 1927 and 1928 imposed a "judicial check" on the bill's 
passage.177 There the matter rested until five years later when the 
Court reversed itself in Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Railway 
v. Wallace,178 holding that a state declaratory judgment act is ap- 
propriate for the presentation of justiciable controversies. This 
holding, discrediting the trilogy's "denunciatory dicta"179 about the 
constitutionality of declaratory judgment actions, cleared the way 
for the federal bill's passage. 
In Wallace, a railroad brought an action for a declaration that 
a state tax was unconstitutional and sought Supreme Court review 
of the state court's adverse ruling. Since the state was threatening 
the issue, speed the decision, and settle the controversy before an accumulation of differ- 
ences and hostility has engendered a wide and general conflict."). 
175. 1922 House Hearings, supra note 91, at 15 (testimony of Merrill Moores). 
176. The earlier draft read, in pertinent part: 
In cases of actual controversy in which, if suits were brought, the courts 
of the United States would have jurisdiction, the said courts upon petition 
shall have jurisdiction to declare rights and other legal relations on re- 
quest of any interested party for such declarations whether or  not further 
relief is or  could have been prayed, and such declarations shall have the 
force of final decree [sic] and be reviewable as such. 
H.R. 5623, 70th Cong., 1st Sess., 69 CONG. REC. 2025 (1928). 
It  is not entirely clear why this language was eliminated. Professor Borchard, 
before the Senate Subcommittee, objected to the language because "that term 'if suits 
were brought' would lead some to believe that this is not a suit." 1928 Senate Hearings, 
supra note 94, at 40. This may suggest more a concern with the ubiquitous article 111 
controversy than a fear that the Act would limit statutory federal question jurisdiction. 
Interestingly, the Act that initially passed the Senate contained this restrictive lan- 
guage, but it was quickly recalled and the language deleted when Senator King, the 
bill's sponsor, explained that the Judiciary Committee "inadvertently reported" this 
version of the bill to the Senate. 73 CONG. REC. 10919 (1934) (statement of Sen. King). 
177. Note, Declaratory Relief in The Supreme Court, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1090 
(1932). 
178. 288 U.S. 249 (1933). 
179. 1928 Senate Hearings, supra note 94, at 7 (testimony of Charles Taft). 
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to enforce the tax,lso the Court's jurisdiction to review declaratory 
judgment cases was squarely presented for the first time.lsl Justice 
Stone's opinion for a unanimous Court (including Justice Brandeis, 
the author of WiIling)lS2 held that "the Constitution does not re- 
quire that the case or controversy should be presented by traditional 
forms of procedure, invoking only traditional remedies."lS3 Be- 
cause the railroad's case was "real and substantial," the Court had 
constitutional authority to review, notwithstanding that the plaintiff 
sought no coercive relief. "[S]uch relief," the Court held, "is not an 
indispensable adjunct to the exercise of the judicial function."lS4 
Wallace cleared the way for passage of the federal Act, which 
shortly followed. 185 
D. The Significance of the Legislative History 
As is often true, the legislative history does not definitively re- 
solve all possible issues. For example, Congress did not discuss the 
application of the well-pleaded complaint rulelS6 to the determina- 
tion of federal question jurisdiction in declaratory judgment cases, 
the precise issue presented in SkeIly and Franchise Tax Board. 
Most of the testimony and debate concerned the declaratory judg- 
ment's effect on diversity claims, not actions brought as federal 
180. 288 U.S. at 261. This distinguishes Wallace from Liberty Warehouse I and 
from Willing, where no enforcement was threatened. See supra notes 131, 142-43 and 
accompanying text. 
181. Professor Borchard, aided by Professor Charles E. Clark, grasped the case's 
importance prior to  the decision and filed what the Court termed an "elaborate brief 
dealing with the nature and history of declaratory judgments, and sustaining the juris- 
diction to review the judgment in this case." 288 U.S. at  258. 
182. Professor Borchard attributed the turnabout to "the initiative and diplomacy of 
Justices Stone and Hughes for redeeming the earlier vagaries of the court and for giving 
the 'new' procedure an understanding endorsement." Borchard Address, supra note 
112, at  4. 
183. Wallace, 288 U.S. at 264. 
184. Id. at 263 (citing Fidelity Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Swope, 274 U.S. 123 
(1927)). The Court made short shrift of the trilogy. The opinion does not mention 
Liberty Warehouse I, and refers to Liberty Warehouse II and Willing only to say that in 
those cases it "was thought" the difficulty was that the plaintiffs merely sought "a deci- 
sion advising what the law would be on an uncertain or  hypothetical state of facts." Id. 
at 262. 
185. See supra note 151 and accompanying text. The American Bar Association 
greeted passage of the Act enthusiastically. Editorial, Congress Strengthens the Machin- 
ery of Justice, 20 A.B.A. J. 422-23 (1934) (The Act will "strengthen the administration 
of justice by enlarging the field of judicial power and usefulness."); see also Williams, 
Book Review, 20 A.B.A. J. 774, 775 (1934) ("Whatever comes to much of other legisla- 
tion by the last Congress [the Declaratory Judgment Act] will in time come to be known 
as the greatest advance in federal jurisprudence within the memory of living men."). 
186. See supra notes 156-61 and accompanying text. 
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question cases.18' Nevertheless, the legislative history strongly sug- 
gests that Justice Frankfurter's view, that Congress intended the 
Declaratory Judgment Act to have no jurisdictional effect, is with- 
out historic support. 
Frankfurter's approach is flawed because it imprecisely uses 
the term "jurisdiction." In one sense, Congress did not intend the 
Declaratory Judgment Act to have a "jurisdictional" effect. But 
how did Congress use the word?lE8 The history of the Act demon- 
strates that Congress was solely concerned with article I11 case-or- 
controversy problems, not about the expansion of statutory jurisdic- 
tion in the ways later prohibited by Skelly. 
What, exactly, was Congress's intent concerning the three cate- 
gories of federal question cases excluded by the Skelly approach? 
First, Congress clearly intended to embrace the negative declara- 
tory judgment, whose benefits were praised by the early reformers 
and whose use necessarily expands federal jurisdiction. The legisla- 
tive history provides strong evidence that Congress passed the Act, 
in large part, to provide a remedy for parties who wished to seek 
judicial relief but did not have a traditional remedy. Congress 
therefore wanted to include cases that the lower courts otherwise 
could not entertain. 
Given the endorsement of the negative declaratory judgment 
action, one would expect to find some indication in the record if 
Congress wished to prevent its application to federal question cases. 
The indications are contrary. For example, Congress specifically 
approved mirror-image declaratory judgment actions. In such 
cases, patent infringement disputes being the most prevalent, the 
issues being adjudicated are almost entirely federal. Thus, Congress 
clearly contemplated the Edelmann approach,la9 which permits 
federal declaratory judgment actions by alleged patent infringers. 
187. Professor Borchard suggested that, had the Supreme Court in Liberty Ware- 
house II not made it impossible to use state declaratory judgment acts in diversity cases, 
Congress might not have passed the Act. Borchard, Federal Act, supra note 168, at 
37-38. 
188. Justice Frankfurter remarked in a case decided only two terms after Skelly, "I 
do not use the term jurisdiction because it is a verbal coat of too many colors." United 
States v. Tucker Truck Lines, 344 U.S. 33, 39 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); see 
also A. ERHENZWEIG, D. LOUISELL & G. HAZARD, JURISDICTION I A NUTSHELL, 
STATE AND FEDERAL 6-7 (4th ed. 1980) ("[Tlhe word 'jurisdiction' covers a multitude 
of ideas. It is indeed a chameleonic [sic] word, a cloak of many colors."). 
189. See supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text. 
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To the extent that Skelly is inconsistent with this approach, it is 
wrongly decided. lgO 
The legislative history relating to the federal-defense categoiy 
is less dramatic, but the balance still tips in favor of jurisdiction. 
The evidence indicates that Congress contemplated declaratory 
judgment actions to challenge the constitutionality of governmental 
actions. Soon after the Act passed, Professor Borchard identified 
this as one of its primary benefits.191 This benefit only exists if the 
Act is interpreted to allow a party to sue for a declaration of the 
validity of a federal defense to a threatened state enforcement 
proceeding. lg2 
Federal question jurisdiction in this kind of case differs from 
that in the mirror-image lawsuit. In federal-defense cases, allowing 
jurisdiction provides a forum for cases that otherwise would be 
heard in state courts. In contrast, allowing jurisdiction in mirror- 
image suits opens the federal courts to federal controversies earlier 
190. It is possible to argue that the language of Skelly is not inconsistent with 
Edelmann. After all, Justice Frankfurter cited with approval the very page of the 
Haward Law Review note on declaratory judgments that argued for the assertion of 
federal question jurisdiction over federal-defense cases when the federal defense 
"arise[s] in answer to a complaint which itself would properly raise a federal question." 
See Skelly, 339 U.S. at 674 (citing Note, supra note 103, at 803). Frankfurter also said 
that jurisdiction "means the kinds of issues which give right of entrance to federal 
courts." Skelly, 339 U.S. at 671 (emphasis added). That statement is consistent with 
allowing jurisdiction for cases that present federal issues for adjudication, independent 
of how they would be presented in a common law action. The problem we address in 
this Article, therefore, may be the interpretation of Skelly by others afterwards, not 
Skelly itself. On the other hand, Justice Frankfurter's misunderstanding of the legisla- 
tive history of the Act must certainly have contributed to the possible misinterpretation 
of Skelly. 
191. Borchard, Federal Act, supra note 168, at 49 ("[Tlhe greatest usefulness of the 
declaratory judgment in the federal jurisdiction will probably lie in the field of constitu- 
tional and administrative law, in the testing of the statutory and administrative powers 
of officials under federal and state legislation."). 
192. One commentator takes the position that declaratory judgment cases raising 
federal challenges to state or local actions are not federal-defense cases because, in real- 
ity, a direct coercive federal action is available: "injunctive actions . . . under the doc- 
trine of Ex parte Young." Comment, Federal Jurisdiction over Declaratory Suits 
Challenging State Action, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 983, 984 (1979). Appealing as that ap- 
proach is, it has several difficulties. First, the categories of federal question cases often 
overlap. See, e.g., Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 
U.S. 1 (1983), discussed supra notes 66-76 and accompanying text. This approach does 
not address how one should proceed under Skelly in such a situation. Second, and more 
important, this approach is inconsistent with the legislative history of the Act, which 
suggests that Congress did not believe that there was a realistic chance in such cases of 
mounting a successful injunctive challenge to state regulations. See supra notes 165-67 
and accompanying text. This is precisely the reason that the supporters of the declara- 
tory judgment remedy argued for providing an alternative remedy. 
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than they would otherwise be heard; it does not remove cases from 
the state courts. The legislative history shows that Congress in- 
tended the Act to be forum-opening, but less evidence suggests that 
Congress meant it to be forum-displacing. 
One could plausibly argue that no jurisdiction to hear a fed- 
eral-defense case exists without a frank recognition by Congress 
that the Act was meant to provide new power to federal courts to 
hear cases that otherwise would have been heard in state court. 
Congress never explicitly stated that the Act was meant to take 
these kinds of cases from state courts. On the other hand, abundant 
evidence shows that Congress understood the importance of fed- 
eral-defense claims for vindication of federal rights.193 Given that 
recognition, and a similar recognition that by expanding diversity 
jurisdiction Congress was increasing federal courts' power to hear 
state claims, it is difficult to conclude that Congress meant to com- 
pel exclusion of federal-defense cases. Moreover, Congress cer- 
tainly knew of Ex parte in which the Supreme Court had 
endorsed a forum-displacing use of federal injunctive power. It is 
unlikely that Congress meant the declaratory remedy to be treated 
any differently. 
No legislative history addresses the category of case involved in 
Skelly itself, the federal-reply case. Here, unlike the first two cate- 
gories, no evidence exists that Congress even thought specifically 
about such cases. For federal-reply cases, therefore, the record does 
not directly resolve the matter. On the other hand, the nature of 
such cases suggests no inherent reason to treat them as analytically 
different from federal-defense cases for jurisdictional purposes. 
Neither type of case, as a coercive action, satisfies the well-pleaded 
complaint rule, but both present the same compelling reasons for 
permitting federal adjudication of federal issues that Congress 
found persuasive. 195 
If fidelity to Congress's intent is the test, therefore, one must 
reject Justice Frankfurter's history lesson in Skelly. It specifically 
contradicts Congress's expressed intent to permit either party to a 
federal cause of action to bring a declaratory judgement action, and 
to permit parties to raise federal defenses to state laws affirmatively. 
The Act does not require Frankfurter's approach of ignoring the 
193. SENATE REPORT, supra note 155, at 2-3. 
194. 209 U.S. 123 (1908). Railroads challenging a Minnesota rate-fixing statute on 
federal constitutional grounds brought a federal action to enjoin its enforcement. The 
Court allowed the action. 
195. See supra notes 165-68, 174-75, and accompanying text. 
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allegations of the declaratory judgment complaint in favor of those 
of a non-existent coercive complaint. Instead, the history of the Act 
demonstrates that to do so undermines the Act's purposes. 
The failure of Justice Frankfurter's historical position compels 
reexamination of the relationship between the Declaratory Judg- 
ment Act and federal question jurisdiction. The Supreme Court's 
view of the declaratory judgment is inconsistent. The Court has si- 
multaneously endorsed both the Skelly approach and a different 
mode of analysis consistent with actual congressional intent. The 
following examination of the war between the two approaches dem- 
onstrates why a return to Congress's original view of the mission of 
the Declaratory Judgment Act is necessary. 
On one hand, the Supreme Court's treatment of federal ques- 
tion jurisdiction in declaratory judgment cases fails to consider 
properly Congress's intent in enacting the Declaratory Judgment 
Act. On the other hand, the Court's most recent declaratory judg- 
ment case demonstrates its inability to subscribe completely to Jus- 
tice Frankfurter's limited view. Thus, in Franchise Tax Board, the 
Court attempted to be faithful to the spirit of Skelly,l96 but en- 
dorsed Edelmann & Co. v. Triple-A Specialty Co. ,I9' which embod- 
ied a mode of analysis inconsistent with Skelly but wholly 
consistent with Congress's true intent. Simultaneously, the Court 
lauded American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co. ,I9* which 
is consistent with Skelly, but fatally inconsistent with Edelmann. 
A. American Well Works and Edelmann: Jurisdictional Results 
in Conflict 
In American Well Works, the plaintiff complained that the de- 
fendant threatened to sue plaintiff's customers, prospective custom- 
ers, and plaintiff under a claim that plaintiff's pump infringed 
defendant's patented design. Plaintiff sued for damages to its busi- 
ness, alleging that its device did not infringe defendant's patents and 
196. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1 ,  17-18 
(1983). 
197. 88 F.2d 852 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 300 U.S. 680 (1937). 
198. 241 U.S. 257 (1916). The case was also highly praised even more recently in 
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 807-10 (1986), dis- 
cussed supra at notes 41-51 and accompanying text. See supra notes 32-34 and accom- 
panying text for a discussion of American Well Works's place in the development of 
federal question jurisdiction. 
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that defendant's statements were malicious and defamatory. The 
Supreme Court ruled that the action was essentially one for trade 
libel, a state claim that could not be maintained as a federal ques- 
tion case despite the obvious questions of patent law that would 
arise during the course of the litigation.lg9 Justice Holmes an- 
nounced the law-that-creates-the-cause-of-action test200 for federal 
question jurisdiction.201 
In Edelmann, Triple-A Specialty Company complained that 
the Edelmann Company was falsely representing to Triple-A's cus- 
tomers and prospective customers that Triple-A's product infringed 
Edelmann's patent. Triple-A also alleged that although Edelmann 
had not filed an action, the parties had a dispute under the patent 
laws. 'Triple-A claimed that its device did not infringe Edelmann's 
patent, and that the patent was void. Triple-A sought a declaration 
to that effect and an injunction to restrain Edelmann from continu- 
ing its course of conduct. The Seventh Circuit found federal ques- 
tion jurisdiction. 
The court noted that the Declaratory Judgment Act was not 
intended to "create new substantive rights or legal relationships."202 
It also observed that "prior to the passage of the act, no one had a 
right under the patent laws to initiate suits for affirmative relief in 
the form of an adjudication that another's patent was invalid or was 
not infringed."203 Thus, the' important question was whether the 
newly styled controversy arose under the patent laws.204 The court 
decided that it did, because Congress intended the Declaratory 
Judgment Act to permit such cases without the parties' waiting for 
damages to a~crue.~OS 
199. American Well Works, 241 U.S. at 259-60. 
200. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
201. See supra notes 41-51 and accompanying text. 
202. 88 F.2d at 853. One must note here the difference between the Seventh Cir- 
cuit's perception of the limitations of the Declaratory Judgment Act and that of the 
Skelly Court 13 years later. The Seventh Circuit asserted that the Act created no new 
substantive rights. Skelly asserted that Congress intended no jurisdictional effect, a 
purely procedural matter. The legislative history clearly favors the Seventh Circuit's 
view, and the confusion Skelly created might have been avoided if Justice Frankfurter 
and his colleagues had appreciated this distinction. 
203. Id. 
204. Edelmann is an example of the mirror-image action that Congress had sought 
to facilitate. See supra notes 162-64 and accompanying text. 
205. 88 F.2d at 854. This, of course, inherently contradicts the Supreme Court's 
later assertion in Skelly that the Declaratory Judgment Act was not intended to permit 
federal courts to hear cases under the Act that they could not have heard in its absence. 
Or, at least, it demonstrates that Congress did contemplate accelerating the timing of 
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The surface parallel between American Well Works and 
Edelmann is obvious, but further analysis reinforces the resem- 
blance. Every plaintiff must have a cause of action in order to 
maintain a American Well Works's cause of action, as iden- 
tified by Justice Holmes, was trade libel. It is tempting to say that 
Triple-A's action arose under the patent laws. However, the claim 
created by the patent laws is for patent infringement. That claim 
belonged to the respondent Edelmann, not petitioner Triple-A.207 
litigation, an assertion well borne out by the Act's legislative history. See supra notes 
165-68 and accompanying text. 
Commentators diverge on whether this mode of analysis in declaratory judgment 
cases involving patents is valid. Compare Note, supra note 12, at 838 ("[Alnalysis of the 
Edelmann situation shows clearly that there is involved in the case a federally-created 
right, one conferred upon the patentee by the federal patent laws.") with Note, Federal 
Jurisdiction Over Declaratory Judgment Proceedings in Patent Cases, 45 YALE L.J. 1287, 
1287 (1936) (use of the declaratory judgment device by alleged patent infringers violates 
the well-pleaded complaint rule). 
Both commentators are correct. Applying the Declaratory Judgment Act in this 
way violates at least the spirit, if not the letter, of Skelly's interpretation of the well- 
pleaded complaint rule, even though the case presents only federal issues. But federal 
adjudication of such a case is consistent with Congress's intent. See supra notes 162-64 
and accompanying text. This has profound implications for declaratory judgment cases 
and for the well-pleaded complaint rule. See infra notes 251-57 and accompanying 
text. 
206. "The right to maintain an action depends upon the existence of what is termed 
a cause of action." Duffy v. Lipsman-Fulkerson & Co., 200 F. Supp. 71, 72 (D. Mont. 
1961). 
A prerequisite to the maintenance of any action for specific relief is that the plain- 
tiff claim an invasion of her legal rights, either past or threatened. She must, therefore, 
allege conduct which is "illegal" in the sense that the respondent suggests. If she does 
not, she has not stated a cause of action. Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce 
Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 693 (1949). Even when the members of the Supreme Court disa- 
gree on the precise rationale, they do agree that the absence of a cause of action is fatal. 
"[Tlhe failure to state a proper cause of action calls for a judgment on the merits and 
not for want of jurisdiction." Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946). "The district 
court is without jurisdiction as a federal court unless the complaint states a cause of 
action arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States." Id. at 685 (Stone, 
C.J., dissenting); see also Olan Mills, Inc. v. Cannon Aircraft Executive Terminal, Inc., 
273 N.C. 519, 160 S.E.2d 735 (1968); Locke v. Johns-Manville Corp., 221 Va. 951, 275 
S.E.2d 900 (1981); J. GOULD, A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF PLEADING IN CIVIL 
ACTIONS 38 (4th ed. 1873); G. PHILLIPS, AN EXPOSITION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF 
PLEADING UNDER THE CODES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 32 (1896); J. POMEROY, POME- 
ROY'S CODE REMEDIES 528 (5th ed. 1929). 
207. Indeed, only two years before Edelmonn, a federal court specifically ruled that 
the plaintiff in such a situation has no patent claim. 
Plaintiff has no patent, actual or prospective. It has no patent rights 
of its own to sustain. Neither its product nor its process of making hats 
infringe the patent held by the defendant, according to the petition. Con- 
sequently, the validity or invalidity of defendant's patent affects no right 
of plaintiff that arises out of the patent laws of the country. No judgment 
that might be entered on this petition would promote or retard any inter- 
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Triple-A's complaint reveals that the underlying cause of action was 
defamation (trade libel) and interference with plaintiff's business- 
precisely the pattern in American Well Works. The complaints dif- 
fer only in the type of relief requested.208 
The jurisdictional inconsistency between American Well Works 
and Edelmann is thus unavoidable. The Seventh Circuit premised 
federal jurisdiction in Edelmann upon the theory that it was a pat- 
ent case.209 But patent cases are not merely federal; they are exclu- 
sively so.210 Thus, if Edelmann is properly a federal case, American 
Well Works cannot properly be a state case.211 Nonetheless, the 
courts reached different results in the two cases. Perhaps if Ameri- 
can Well Works had been able to plead under the Declaratory Judg- 
est of plaintiff that has its basis in the patent laws. There is no actual 
controversy existing between the parties of such a nature as to confer 
jurisdiction on this court. The controversy that exists arises out of the 
competitive position of the parties in the trade, and not out of the patent 
laws. 
International Harvest Hat Co. v. Caradine Hat Co., 17 F. Supp. 79, 80 (E.D. Mo. 
1935). International Harvest thus refused jurisdiction in a case clearly in the Edelmann 
pattern, but it has not been widely followed, although some state courts have ruled that 
actions to enjoin patentees' threats to sue under the patent laws are not themselves 
patent cases. See, e.g., Zemba v. Rodgers, 87 N.J. Super. 518,210 A.2d 95 (1965); New 
Era Elec. Range Co. v. Serrell, 252 N.Y. 107, 169 N.E. 105 (1929); Temp-Resisto Corp. 
v. Deering, Milliken & Co., 123 N.Y.S.2d 217 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1953). The Edelmann 
court itself disagreed with the district court's jurisdictional conclusion, though without 
directly disputing its assertion that the plaintiff, the alleged infringer, had no cause of 
action under the patent laws. Edelmann, 88 F.2d at 854. 
208. A reproduction of the American Well Works complaint appears in Appendix A; 
one of the Edelmann complaint in Appendix B. 
209. See supra notes 204-05 and accompanying text. 
210. 28 U.S.C. 5 1338 (1982). 
21 1. The Supreme Court implicitly adopted this view, making clear that a state's 
law of unfair competition cannot impinge on the province of the patent laws by granting 
protection where the patent laws do not. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 
U.S. 225 (1964). The Supremacy Clause, U.S. CONST. art. VI, 4 2, prevents the states 
from casting unfair competition laws in terms that fail to recognize existing patent law 
protection. See also Chapman Performance Prods., Inc. v. Producers Sales, Inc., 16 Ill. 
App. 3d 459, 306 N.E.2d 615 (1973); Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Melody Record- 
ings, 124 N.J. Super. 322, 306 A.2d 493 (1973). 
The state courts, however, have not all recognized the effect of Edelmann. See, 
e.g., Zemba, 87 N.J. Super. at 518, 210 A.2d at 95; Temp-Resisto, 123 N.Y.S.2d at 217. 
Temp-Resisto specifically held an action by an alleged infringer to enjoin threats to sue 
under the patent laws was not federal, citing American Well Works among others. But 
see Grip Nut Co. v. Sharp, 124 F.2d 814 (7th Cir. 1941); Lionel Corp. v. De Filippis, 11 
F. Supp. 7 12, 716 (E.D.N.Y. 1935); Shores v. Chip Steak Co., 130 Cal. App. 2d 620, 
625, 279 P.2d 591, 594 (1955) ("[P]laintiff's election to sue for declaratory judgment 
that he is not an infringer does not give the state court power to hear the case; the 
controversy remains one of exclusive federal jurisdiction.") (citing Edelmann, 88 F.2d 
at 853); Cheatham Elec. Switching Device Co. v. Kentucky Switching & Signal Co., 213 
Ky. 23, 280 S.W. 469, 471 (1926)). 
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ment Act, it would have been able to maintain its case in federal 
Edelmann seems to prove this. 
B. Edelmann and Skelly: Jurisdictional Methods in Conflict 
If Edelmann is the declaratory embodiment of ~mer i i an  Well 
Works, then its result violates the principles articulated in Skelly. 
Skelly states that the Declaratory Judgment Act was intended to 
have no jurisdictional effect and, therefore, that no case ineligible 
for jurisdiction in the federal courts as a coercive action should be 
entertained as a declaratory, action.213 American Well Works is the 
coercive case corresponding to Edelmann, and it cannot qualify for 
federal question jurisdiction because of the well-pleaded complaint 
rule. Skelly requires declaratory cases to be analyzed based on the 
coercive action underlying the plaintiff's declaratory complaint. Yet 
the Edelmann court, not having the benefit of Justice Frankfurter's 
analysis in Skelly, looked not to the plaintiff's underlying coercive 
action, which sounded in state tort, but to the defendant's, which 
would have been an exclusively federal claim of patent infringe- 
ment.2'4 In short, the jurisdictional theories of American Well 
Works, Skelly, and Edelmann cannot coexist. 
Edelmann and Skelly thus exemplify different methods of ana- 
lyzing declaratory judgment actions for federal question jurisdiction 
purposes. Skelly, from the Supreme Court, commands examination 
of the declaratory plaintiff's underlying coercive action. Edelmann, 
212. No federal act passed until 1934. See Declaratory Judgment Act, ch. 512, 48 
Stat. 455, 956 (1934) (current version at 28 U.S.C. $8 2201-2202 (1982)). Some have 
noted explicitly that the Declaratory Judgment Act was intended to have that effect. 
"That Act, as construed, has been liberally employed to obtain federal court adjudica- 
tions of the questions presented in the American WeN Works case." Muskegon Piston 
Ring Co. v. Olsen, 307 F.2d 85, 90 (6th Cir. 1962) (O'Sullivan, J., dissenting), cert. 
denied, 371 U.S. 952 (1963); accord Aralac, Inc. v. Hat Corp. of Am., 166 F.2d 286 (3d 
Cir. 1948); Grip Nut Co., 124 F.2d at 814. 
213. See supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text. 
214. That is not to say, however, that the Edelmann court was necessarily correct in 
retaining the case merely because a patent question was involved. Despite the fact that 
cases brought to enforce patents are exclusively federal, 28 U.S.C. $ 1338 (1982), state 
courts routinely adjudicate cases containing patent questions but not brought under the 
patent laws. See, e.g., Pratt v. Paris Gas Light & Coke Co., 168 U.S. 255 (1897); Geni- 
Chlor Int'l, Inc. v. Multisonics Dev. Corp., 580 F.2d 981 (9th Cir. 1978); Diematic Mfg. 
Corp. v. Packaging Indus., Inc., 381 F. Supp. 1057 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), appeal dismissed, 
516 F.2d 975 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 913 (1975); American Harley Corp. v. 
Irvin Indus. Inc., 27 N.Y.2d 168, 263 N.E.2d 552, 315 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1970), cert. de- 
nied, 401 U.S. 976 (1971). American Well Works itself is an example. Justice Holmes 
recognized that patent questions might play an important part in resolving the plain- 
tiff's complaint, 241 U.S. at 260, but nonetheless the Court ordered the case remanded 
to the state courts. 
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from the Seventh Circuit, examines the defendant's underlying co- 
ercive action. Interpreting Skelly as disapproving the Edelmann 
method might resolve the inconsistency. However, three problems 
arise with this hypothesis. First, Skelly did not cite Edelmann, even 
to disapprove it.215 Second, the inferior federal courts have followed 
Edelmann 's jurisdictional analysis in cases postdating Skelly;216 ob- 
viously those courts have not thought Edelmann to be fatally incon- 
sistent with Skelly. Third, the Supreme Court cited Edelmann and 
its method of analysis with approval in Franchise Tax Board,217 si- 
multaneously lauding the theory and spirit of Skelly.218 In order to 
understand the true irony of this juxtaposition, reconsideration of 
Franchise Tax Board is in order. 
. . 
i. ' I  ., ,: . . 
C. Edelmann and '~ ranch i se '~ax  ~ o a r d  
Application of the Skellyanalysis in Franchise T a  Board leads 
to clear, but potentially contradictory, results. The results are clear 
because it is not necessary to hypothesize the Franchise Tax Board's 
underlying coercive action; it was pleaded as the first count in the 
twoicount complaint. The coercive action clearly is not a federal 
question case under established analysis; hence, neither is the de- 
215. Justice Frankfurter did include a rather cryptic citation of a student note in the 
Harvard Law Review that discussed Edelmann. Curiously, the Justice cited the exact 
page of the note that mentions Edelmann. Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 
U.S. 667, 674 (1950) (citing Note, supra note 103, at 803). Perhaps this indicates the 
Court's awareness of and acquiescence in the Edelmann analysis, but it is a thin reed 
upon which to make such an assertion. On the other hand, the sentence preceding the 
citation says: 
To sanction suits for declaratory relief as within the jurisdiction of the 
District Courts merely because, as in this case, artful pleading anticipates 
a defense based on federal law would contravene the whole trend of juris- 
dictional legislation by Congress, disregard the effective functioning of 
the federal judicial system and distort.the limited procedural purpose of 
the Declaratory Judgment Act. 
Skelly, 339 U.S. at 673-74. Thus, Justice Frankfurter, by emphasizing the Court's an- 
tipathy to anticipation of federal defenses in declaratory actions, may have implicitly 
recognized the utility and propriety of anticipating federal claims. 
Severalcourts have recognized that function of the Act. See, e.g., Gulf States Paper 
Corp. v. Ingram, 81 1 F.2d 1464, 1467 (11th Cir. 1987); Mobii Oil Corp. v. City of Long 
Beach, 772 F.2d 534, 539 (9th Cir. 1985); Milprint, Inc. v. Curwood, Inc., 562 F.2d 
418, 422 (7th Cir. 1977). 
216. See, e.g., Sticker Indus. Supply Corp. v. Blaw-Knox Co., 367 F.2d 744 (7th Cir. 
1966); National Coupling Co. v. Press-Seal Gasket Corp., 323 F.2d 629 (7th Cir. 1963); 
Japan Gas Lighter Ass'n v. Ronson Corp., 257 F. Supp. 219 (D.N.J. 1966). 
. 217. Franchise Tax.Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 19 
n.19 (1983); see. also Public Sen. Comm'n v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237 (1952). 
Franchise Tax Board is discussed in supra notes 6676  and accompanying text. 
218. ,463 U.S. at 15-19. 
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claratory.claim. The results are contradictory because Skelly analy- 
sis leads to the opposite jurisdictional determination if the ERISA 
trustee, seeking an answer to the same declaratory judgment ques- 
tion, sues first.219 This is, arguably, a less than rational result. 
The Edelmann approach to declaratory judgment cases and 
the Court's endorsement of that approach in Franchise Tax Board 
compounds the irrationality. If, as Edelmann implicitly suggests, 
courts may evaluate declaratory judgment actions by examining the 
declaratory defendant's underlying coercive action, then the 
Franchise Tax Board's suit could have been viewed as federal be- 
cause the defendant Trust's underlying coercive action was fed- 
era1.220 The unanimous Court did not simplify the matter by 
approving Edelmann without explaining why it did not use the 
same approach in Franchise Tax Board.221 Thus, the Court left a 
conundrum: When confronted by a declaratory judgment action, 
should one analyze its jurisdictional propriety under the Skelly 
method or the Edelmann method? Sometimes they will give identi- 
cal res~lts.~22 But in cases like Franchise Tax Board or Edelmann, 
in which the two methods result in inconsistent jurisdictional con- 
clusions, what is the district court to do? 
219. See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text. 
220. Indeed, since the coercive federal action possessed by the Construction Labor- 
ers Vacation Trust is exclusively federal, either removal or dismissal would be the only 
alternative for such cases. 463 U.S. at 20 n.20 (citing 29 U.S.C. 5 1132(a)(3) (1982)), 24 
n.26. 
221. The Court also previouslj approved the Edelmann approach by implication: 
In this case, as in many actions for declaratory judgment, the realistic 
position of the parties is reversed. . . . Where the complaint in an action 
for declaratory judgment seeks in essence to assert a defense to an im- 
pending or threatened state court action, it is the character of the 
threatened action, and not of the defense, which will determine whether ' 
there is federal-question jurisdiction in the District Court. If the cause of 
action, which the declaratory defendant threatens to assert, does not itself 
involve a claim under federal law, it is doubtful if a federal court may 
entertain an action for a declaratory judgment establishing a defense to 
that claim. 
Public Sew. Comm'n v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237, 248 (1952). Thus, in declaratory 
cases where the declaratory defendant asserted a coercive action, the Court prescribed 
an analysis of the defendant's potential action. In Wycofl, the Court hypothesized a 
defendant's state-created coercive action, but the Court's theory should apply equally 
when the declaratory defendant's action is federal. 
222. Skelly itself is an example. Phillips's underlying coercive action sounded in 
contract, so Phillips did not need to plead the federal matter in order to state its con- 
tract claim. Skelly Oil had no underlying coercive action corresponding to Phillips's 
declaratory judgment action, since Phillips was seeking relief for Skelly Oil's anticipa- 
tory breach. The only coercive action Skelly Oil would ever have had would have been 
an action for nonpayment on the contract, clearly a matter raising no federal issue at all. 
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D. Skelly Revisited 
Viewing Edelmann in light of the principles of Skelly, it is evi- 
dent that one of three things happened in Edelmann. First, the case 
may represent an exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule. Sec- 
ond, the Edelmann plaintiff may have been permitted to come into 
federal court on the basis of the defendant's cause of action. Third, 
the Edelmann court may have de facto recognized a cause of action 
created by the Declaratory Judgment Act running in favor of a 
party in the plaintiff's position. 
The Supreme Court?s steadfast adherence to the well-pleaded 
complaint rule undercuts the possibility that Edelmann represents 
an exception. In Franchise Tax Board, while admitting that "[tlhe 
rule . . . may produce awkward re~ults,"~?3 Justice Brennan simulta- 
neously paid it homage. Franchise Tax Board is, in part, the result 
of the Court's reverence for the well-pleaded complaint principle. 
In fact, the Supreme Court has never announced an exception to the 
Mottley r ~ l e . ~ ~ 4  
It would be unusual indeed for the Court to permit a plaintiff 
to come into the district court on the basis of the defendant's cause 
of action. First of all, it creates problems analogous to standing 
concerns, in which a party may assert her own rights, but rarely 
those of another person.225 Second, if a plaintiff can rely for juris- 
223. Franchise Tax Ed., 463 U.S. at 12. 
224. However, the Court has de facto endorsed an exception to the rule, allowing 
plaintiffs to seek relief against threatened action by state or local governments that 
would interfere with federal rights. See, e.g., Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 
151 (1978); Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977); Cox Cable New Orleans, 
Inc. v. City of New Orleans, 594 F. Supp. 1452 (E.D. La. 1984). But the Court has not 
discussed the exception, nor applied it in other circumstances. 
225. See, e.g., United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980) (suppression of evidence 
denied where unlawful search invaded a third party's privacy but not the defendant's); 
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972) (standing denied where no member of the 
plaintiff club alleged injury to his or her individual interests). But see Carey v. Popula- 
tion Sews. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (vendors of contraceptive devices permitted to 
assert the interests of prospective purchasers in arguing that statute restricting sale of 
such devices was unconstitutional); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (beer vendor 
had standing to argue equal protection claim of 18 to 21-year-old males that statute 
forbidding oily males in-that age group to drink alcoholic beverages was unconstitu- 
tional). It is fair to say, however, that third-party standing is generally disfavored. See, 
e.g., Cmig, 429 U.S. at 190; Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976). See generally Sed- 
ler, The Assertion of Constitutional Jus Tertii: A Substantive Appmch, 70 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1308, 1309 (1982) ("[A] party should be able to prevail in constitutional litigation 
only if he can show some violation of his own rights."). 
For purposes of the jurisdictional inquiry, however, the matter is one step removed 
from traditional standing principles. Assuming arguendo that Triple-A was relying 
upon Edelmann's patent infringement cause of action for jurisdictional purposes, it did 
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diction upon the defendant's unpleaded cause of action in a declara- 
tory judgment action, why should she not be permitted to do so in a 
coercive action as well? If that principle were accepted by the 
courts, American Well Works would have to be disapproved, since 
in that case the defendant would have had an action for patent in- 
fringement.226 Clearly, Edelmann cannot lead to this conclusion. 
The remaining possibility is that Edelmann de facto recognized 
a cause of action created by the Declaratory Judgment 
Triple-A's underlying coercive cause of action sounds in tort and 
will not support the district court's federal question jurisdiction.228 
The only other possibility providing Triple-A federal question juris- 
diction is if the Declaratory Judgment Act, by allowing parties to 
present claims in the minor-image situation, has created an antici- 
patory cause of action. If that is so, then perhaps any case present- 
ing such a cause of action could be heard in the federal courts, even 
under the test of American Well Works, because federal law creates 
the cause of acti0n.~29 That, however, may take the matter a bit too 
far. The next section will discuss how the Declaratory Judgment 
Act and federal subject matter jurisdiction principles ought to mesh 
not seek a favorable judgment on the basis of Edelmann's patent rights, whereas in the 
third-party standing cases, the plaintiffs have sought recovery based upon the rights of 
others. Triple-A, in contrast, sought to defeat the asserted federal right of the party 
upon whose claim jurisdiction depended. 
226. 241 U.S. at 257; see also supm notes 32-34 and accompanying text. Further- 
more, in Franchise Tax Bwrd, the Tax Board's coercive action to enforce the tax levy 
would become federal even if unaccompanied by a declaratory action, since the defend- 
ant Trust's action under ERISA is clearly federal. 
227. At least some courts have recognized that the Declaratory Judgment Act has 
had this effect. E.g., Nova Biomedical Corp. v. Moller, 629 F.2d 190, 196 (1st Cir. 
1980) ("[wailing a letter charging infringement and threatening suit is already a two- 
edged sword; it is well-established that such conduct creates an 'actual controversy' and 
thus gives rise to a cause of action under the Declaratory Judgment Act.") (citation 
omitted); Dewy & Almy Chemical Co. v. American Anode, Inc., 137 F.2d 68 (3d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 320 U.S. 761 (1943); see also Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil 
Co., 312 U.S. 270 (1941). Contra Reiter v. Illinois Nat'l Casualty Co., 213 F.2d 946 
(7th Cir. 1954): 
It merely furnished a procedural remedy which did not previously exist. 
It granted authority to employ a new remedy in enforcing a cause of ac- 
tion for which there was previously a remedy only at a different time; it 
did not increase in anywise the jurisdiction of the United States District 
Court over the substantive rights of litigants or create new causes of 
action. 
Id. at 949. 
228. It is, essentially, the same cause of action that American Well Works had and 
that Justice Holmes declared insufficient to support federal question jurisdiction. See 
supra notes 206-08 and accompanying text. 
229. "A suit arises under the law that creates the cause of action." American WeN 
Works, 241 U.S. at ,260; see supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text. 
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to give proper weight to Congress's intention when it passed the 
Act. 
IV. THE DECLARATORY JUDGMENT'S CAUSE OF ACTION AND 
ITS JURISDICTIONAL EFFECTS. 
A. The Declaratory ~ u d ~ m e n t  Act as a Cause of Action 
Black's Law Dictionary suggests no fewer than nine definitions 
for the term "cause of a~tion."~~O The courts, too, have articulated 
more than one formulation.231 In fact, the Act fits well within sev- 
eral possible definitions of "cause of action." 
Consider, for example, the prototypical mirror-image case that 
Congress contemplated the new procedure should affect: the alleged 
patent infringer who wants a judicial determination of whether his 
course of business conduct is exposing him to liability.232 Before 
the Declaratory Judgment Act, the alleged infringer could not sue 
in federal court to establish either that his product did not infringe 
the patent or that the patent was invalid. In American Well Works, 
the alleged infringer's complaint could assert only a cause of action 
for trade libel, which did not support federal jurisdiction. After the 
Act, however, Triple-A Specialty Company was able to raise both 
of its claims in a federal proceeding. Indeed, Congress clearly in- 
tended to overrule American Well Works's jurisdictional holding, 
and Edelmann implictly recognizes that intent. To paraphrase the 
230. The fact or facts which give a person a right to judicial relief. The legal 
effect of an occurrence in terms of redress to a party to the occurrence. A 
situation or state of facts which would entitle party to sustain action and 
give him right to seek a judicial remedy in his behalf. . . . Fact, or a state 
of facts, to which law sought to be enforced against a person or thing 
applies. Facts which give rise to one or more relations of right-duty be- 
tween two or more persons. Failure to perform legal obligation to do, or 
refrain from performance of, some act. Matter for which action may be 
maintained. Unlawful violation or invasion of right. The right which a 
party has to institute a judicial proceeding. 
BLACK'S ~ A W  DICTIONARY 201 (5th ed. 1979) (citation omitted). 
231. See, e.g., Rhodes v. Jones, 351 F.2d 884, 886 (8th Cir. 1965) ("a situation or 
state of facts which entitles a party to sustain an action and gives him the right to seek 
judicial interference in his behalf"), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 919 (1966); Dery v. Wyer, 
265 F.2d 804, 807 (2d Cir. 1959) ("the aggregate of operative facts which give rise to a 
right enforceable in the courts") (quoting Orringal Ballet Russe v. Ballet Theatre, 133 
F.2d 187, 189 (2d. Cir. 1943)); Busick v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Bd., 7 Cal. 
3d 967,975, 500 P.2d 1386, 1392, 104 Cal. Rptr. 42,48 (1972) ("the obligation sought 
to be enforced") (quoting Panos v. Great Western Packing Co., 21 Cal. 2d 636, 638, 134 
P.2d 242, 244 (1943)). 
232. This is the fact pattern involved in American Well Works, see supra notes 
32-34, 199 and accompanying text, and Edelmann, see supra notes 73-76, 202-12 and 
accompanying text. 
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definitions, prior to the Act an alleged infringer had no .federal 
"right to judicial relief" from the patentee's threats and business 
interference. He was not "entitle[d] . . . to sustain [an] action" or 
"to seek a [federal] judicial remedy in his behalf." He had no "right 
. . . to institute a [federal] judicial proceeding." After the Declara- 
tory Judgment Act, he did. Beyond question,. the Act created a 
cause of action entitling the alleged infringer to pursue federal judi- 
cial relief.233 
B. The Jurisdictional Eflects of the Declaratory Action 
Recognizing a cause of action under the Declaratory Judgment 
Act does not end the inquiry. Because the federal c,ourts are courts 
of limited jurisdiction, one must inquire whether a case qualifies for 
federal jurisdiction, either because of the identity of the parties, as 
in diversity cases, or because of the nature of the claim, as, for ex- 
ample, in federal question or patent ~ases.23~ Thus, one must ex- 
amine any cause of action asserted under the Act in light of federal 
jurisdiction tests to see whether the case may be brought in the fed- 
eral courts. 
The American Well Works test prescribes that a "suit arises 
under the law that creates the cause of acti0n."~~5 Taken at face 
value, that test appears to suggest that any case pleaded under the 
Declaratory Judgment Act becomes a federal question case. One 
233. Justice Frankfurter would perhaps reply that such an exercise demonstrates the 
effect that Congress did not intend the'Declaratory Judgment Act to have, and that 
Congress merely intended to provide another remedy to one already entitled to come 
into federal court. But the legislative history of the Act does not support the assertion. 
In addition, as Professor Borchard and the Seventh Circuit pointed out, see supra note 
63, the Act so limited would have ameliorated none of the conditions that commended 
the declaratory device to Congress's attention. See supra notes 97-111, 154-69 and 
accompanying text. Moreover, such an interpretation of the .Act creates an anomaly 
that violates the Supreme Court's own dicta. It sets up a situation in which a patentee, 
seeking to establish the validity of his patent and whether another person's product 
violates it, may sue in federal court to determine the answers to those questions. The 
alleged infringer, however, cannot sue in federal court to determine the answers to the 
same questions. This is reminiscent of Franchise Tax Board; see supra notes 70-71 and 
accompanying text, in which entitlement to the federal forum turns not upon the words 
spoken, but upon the mouth that speaks them. This directly contradicts the Court's 
admonition in Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 244 (1937), that jurisdic- 
tion should depend on the nature of the message, not the messenger. See supra text 
accompanying note 72. As Professor Doernberg has suggested, "this result cannot be 
supported on any rational ground, and . . . a jurisdictional structure saddled with rules 
that give rise to such a result is a structure sorely in need of change." Doernberg, supra 
note 9, at 646. 
234. See 28 U.S.C. $8 1331, 1338 (1982). 
235. American Well Works Co. v Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916). 
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recoils from the prospect of the Declaratory Judgment Act opening 
the federal courts to any suit that can be pleaded as a declaratory 
judgment case, irrespective of the nature of the controversy or the 
identity of the ~arties.23~ Fortunately, American Well Works can- 
not mean that. In fact, it did not stand for so sweeping a proposi- 
tion even when it was announced in 19 16. 
Only fifteen years before American Well Works, the Court de- 
cided Shoshone Mining Company v. R~tter.23~ Congress created a 
federal cause of action that functioned, in effect, as an enabling act, 
permitting courts to adjudicate disputes involving lands held pursu- 
ant to.federa1 land patents. The Court held that the mere fact that 
federal law authorized adjudication did not make the case a federal 
question.238 American WeN Works did not overrule Shoshone; in 
fact, it did not even cite it. Nonetheless, apart from the natural pre- 
sumption that the Supreme Court is aware of its own precedents, 
one must also note that Justice Holmes, who wrote American Well 
Works, joined the Court only two years after Shoshone was decided 
and was a member of the Court when Shulthis v. M c D o ~ g a l ~ ~ ~  reaf- 
firmed Shoshone's message.240 Furthermore, the Court has relied 
upon Shoshone in cases since American Well Works.241 Thus, it is 
too facile to say that any cause of action created by federal law is 
necessarily a federal question case. The American Well Works test 
overstates the case for federal jurisdiction. Shoshone compels closer 
examination of the controversy presented in any declaratory judg- 
ment case. 
236. For example, two parties, residents of the same state, might be involved in a 
contract dispute with each other. Assuming the contract has no federal components, 
there is no reason for a declaratory judgment action between the parties, even if other- 
wise justiciable, to be heard in the federal courts. 
237. 177 U.S. 505 (1900); see supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text. 
238. 177 U.S. at 507. 
239. 225 U.S. 561 (1912). 
240. Id. at 569-70 (citing Shoshone; other citations omitted): 
A suit to enforce a right which takes its origin in the laws of the United 
States is not necessarily, or for that reason alone, one arising under those 
laws, for a suit does not so arise unless it really and substantially involves 
a dispute or controversy respecting the validity, construction or effect of 
such a law, upon the determination of which the result depends. This is 
especially so of a suit involving rights to land acquired under a law of the 
United States. If it were not. everv suit to establish title to land in the 
central and western States would so arise, as all titles in those States are 
traceable back to those laws. 
241. See, e.g., Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 815 
11.12 (1986). 
Heinonline - -  36 UCLA L. Rev. 584 1988-1989 
19891 DECLARA TOR Y JUDGMENT ACT 585 
Federal courts analyze the nature of the controversy presented 
in light of the outcome-determinative test from Smith v. Kansas City 
Title & Trust C O . , ~ ~ ~  the substantiality test from MerreN Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson,243 and the well-pleaded com- 
plaint rule from Louisville & Nashville Railroad v. M ~ t t I e y . ~ ~ ~  Such 
an inquiry asks only whether the declaratory judgment complaint 
presents a substantial federal issue that can determine the outcome 
of the controversy between the parties. Thus, to analyze a declara- 
tory judgment case for federal question jurisdiction purposes, a 
court should look to the substance of the controversy the complaint 
presents. If the nature of the controversy is federal, the declaratory 
judgment case qualifies for federal question jurisdiction. If the par- 
ties dispute state law, the case should be dismissed. We suggest that 
this is a better method for evaluation of declaratory judgment cases. 
Focusing on the nature of the controversy, rather than on the 
sterile question of whether federal or state law creates the cause of 
action or the artificial question of what a non-existent coercive case 
would look like, responds more accurately to the congressional in- 
tent underlying the Declaratory Judgment Act. Specifically, Con- 
gress intended that mirror-image cases and federal-defense cases be 
heard in the federal courts at the insistence of the party who would 
otherwise have to defend a coercive action. In the mirror-image 
case, the threatened coercive action would be federal, as in the case 
of the alleged patent infringer who seeks a declaration of invalidity 
or noninfringement. But, in the federal-defense case, the threatened 
action is based on state law. Under traditional analysis, it is not a 
federal question case. Yet Congress clearly intended the new De- 
claratory Judgment Act to comprehend such cases.245 The only 
way for the courts to be true to that intention, as they have been in 
the mirror-image patent cases, is to stop regarding declaratory judg- 
242. 255 U.S. 180 (1921); see supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text. 
243. 478 U.S. 804 (1986); see supra notes 43-51 and accompanying text. 
244. 211 U.S. 149 (1908); see supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text. 
245. For example, the plaintiff in Shredded Wheat Co. v. City of Elgin, 284 Ill. 389, 
120 N.E. 248 (1918) unsuccessfully sought to challenge the municipal ordinance taxing 
its product, despite its constitutional claim that the ordinance was invalid. The 
threatened coercive action by the municipality has no federal component as a constitu- 
ent of the cause of action, and so would not qualify for federal question jurisdiction. 
Moreover, the assertion of the federal defense in the coercive action would not alter the 
jurisdictional picture. See, e.g., Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation 
Trust, 463 U.S. 1 (1983); Mottley, 21 1 U.S. at 149. Nonetheless, the record of the De- 
claratory Judgment Act's consideration in Congress demonstrates that Congress wanted 
such cases adjudicated under the Act. See supra notes 154-68 and accompanying text. 
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ment complaints as n0nentities.~~6 This approach does away with 
the artifice, introduced in Skelly, of ignoring the declaratory judg- 
ment complaint for purposes of the jurisdictional inquiry. Courts 
will no longer be required to hypothesize nonexistent documents to 
determine whether cases qualify for federal question jurisdiction.247 
This approach is not only consistent with congressional intent, 
but also with the Supreme Court's occasionally expressed concern 
with looking at the real substance of a case for jurisdictional pur- 
poses, rather than merely at its form.248 In Merrell Dow the Court 
insisted that the true jurisdictional concern is the substantiality of 
the federal issue presented and Congress's intent as to whether it 
should be the subject of federal adjudication. Here Congress's in- 
tent is clear, though it differs from the intent the Court had in mind 
when it announced Merrell Dow. But the Court cannot invoke con- 
gressional intent as a selective talisman to support its own predilec- 
tions concerning the extent of federal court jurisdiction. If the 
mode of analysis is valid, then the Court must accept the analytical 
product. That product, the right of an aggrieved party to come into 
court for an adjudication of the grievance, is the declaratory judg- 
ment cause of action. 
Recognition of the cause of action does not deprive the courts 
of discretion in the exercise of federal jurisdiction. A party desiring 
the federal forum must still show that the federal issue meets Mer- 
re11 Dow's substantiality test. In the mirror-image patent case, such 
a showing is easily made. Congress, having provided exclusive fed- 
eral jurisdiction in patent cases,249 has made clear that such cases 
are sufficiently important for federal jurisdiction to attach. Simi- 
larly, the Franchise Tax Board situation calls for federal resolution. 
congress indicated as much by making the Trust's action for an 
injunction enforcing federal pre-emption exclusively federal.250 On 
the other hand, the way is left open for the courts to decide in a case 
like Skelly--essentially a contract case-that the issue of whether a 
federal certificate is effectively issued on the date of announcement 
or on the day of formal publication is too insubstantial to justify 
federal intervention. Thus, even under the test we propose, Skelly 
might remain ineligible for federal question jurisdiction. 
246. See supra text accompanying note 89. 
247. See supra notes 64-69 and accompanying text. 
248. See, e.g., Shoshone, 177 U.S. 505, discussed supra notes 29-30, 237-41, and 
accompanying text. 
249. 28 U.S.C. 4 1338 (1982). 
250. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text. The Court recognized as much 
when it finally resolved the preemption question in 1987. See supra note 71. 
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One question lingers beyond the scope of this Article. Consider 
for a moment the case of the alleged patent infringer, the prototype 
mirror-image case. Congress intended, and the courts have held, 
that such cases should be treated as federal matters when the al- 
leged infringer seeks a declaration of noninfringement or patent in- 
validity. This, however, produces an anomaly. If the alleged 
infringer elects instead to seek damages, as the American Well 
Works plaintiff did, the ensuing action for trade libel is not a federal 
question case, as Justice Holmes dem~nstrated.~sl Thus, if the al- 
leged infringer seeks declaratory relief, the claims of patent invalid- 
ity and noninfringement can be adjudicated in the federal courts. In 
a suit for damages, on the other hand, the alleged infringer is con- 
fined to the state courts to adjudicate the same issues.252 In short, 
the well-pleaded complaint rule produces inconsistent results as ap- 
plied to the declaratory judgment action or the coercive action. Of 
course, Congress did not create the well-pleaded complaint rule, 
and it has never explicitly endorsed it. On the other hand, it has 
never repudiated it, despite periodic recodification of the federal 
question jurisdiction statute.253 We suggest that the Declaratory 
Judgment Act itself, in light of its manifest purpose, is an implicit 
disapproval of the rule. 
- 
251. See supra notes 32-34, 41-51, 200-01, and accompanying text. 
252. Plaintiffs might attempt to avoid this result by asking the district court to hear 
the state-based coercive action as a pendent state claim, under the doctrine of United 
Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966). The two claims clearly meet the thresh- 
old test of Gibbs since they "derive from a common nucleus of operative fact," id. at 
725, and the plaintiff "would ordinarily be expected to try them in one judicial proceed- 
ing . . . ." Id. However, the Gibbs Court noted that pendent jurisdiction might be 
inappropriate where "the state issues substantially predominate, whether in terms of 
proof, of the scope of the issues raised, or of the comprehensiveness of the remedy 
sought." Id. at 726. Thus, the district court might decide to dismiss the coercive state 
claim, retaining only the declaratory claim. But, in view of the identity of the issues and 
the obvious lack of judicial economy of trying the coercive and declaratory claims sepa- 
rately, a strong argument can be made that the coercive claim should be retained by the 
district court. This is not a case of "making a federal law tail wag a state law dog." 
Saturday Evening Post Co. v. Rumbleseat Press, Inc.; 816 F.2d 1191, 1195 (7th Cir. 
1987). 
The federal-defense case presents the same dichotomy. If the party subject to the 
challenged statute brings a declaratory action to declare its invalidity, the federal court 
will hear the case. But if the party is prosecuted under the statute and raises the federal 
claim as a defense, the case is not removable, despite the fact that the same federal issue 
will determine its outcome. By contrast with the mirror-image patent case, however, 
the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction offers no solution in this situation. 
253. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. As the Court previously cautioned, 
"[i]t is at best treacherous to find in congressional silence alone the adoption of a con- 
trolling rule of law." Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 69 (1946). 
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The inconsistency respecting the well-pleaded complaint rule 
may be dealt with in two ways. The courts can discard the 
or the inconsistency can await congressional resolution. Although 
not the tidiest possible solution, this approach is certainly no worse 
than the situation the Supreme Court created in Franchise Tax 
Board,255 in which federal juhsdiction depends on which party ar- 
rives first at the courtho~se.25~ At least the inconsistency presented 
by the plaintiff's choice of remedy makes federal jurisdiction turn 
upon the plaintiff's own actions, leaving her, as the Court has in- 
sisted she must be, "the master of the complaint."257 
The legislative history of the Declaratory Judgment Act can- 
not, and should not, be ignored. Although .the courts have honored 
that history in the limited area of mirror-image patent cases, they 
have been unwilling to do so for the full range of cases that Con- 
gress intended the Act to affect. Candor in dealing with that legisla- 
tive history requires recognition of the fact that Congress expanded 
federal courts' jurisdiction when it created the cause of action em- 
bodied in the Declaratory Judgment Act. Moreover, as the exten- 
sive testimony of the proponents of the new device shows, Congress 
could not have done so inadvertently. Though the courts may be 
uncomfortable with the policy expressed in the Act, as they have so 
often instructed, it is not their function to pass on the wisdom of 
legi~lation.25~ It is time to recognize the Trojan Horse's contents in 
the light of day. 
254. See Doernberg, supra note 9. 
255. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1 (1983); 
see supra notes 6674 ,  2 19-21, and accompanying text. 
256. See Doernberg, supra note 9, at 645 & n.214. 
257. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 107 S. Ct. 2425, 2433 (1987). "[A] federal ques- 
tion must appear on the face of the complaint, and . . . the plaintiff may, by eschewing 
claims basedon federal law, choose to have the cause heard in state court." Id.; accord 
Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22 (1913). 
258. The Court made this point particularly strongly in upholding a provision of the 
Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. 55 1531-1543 (1982), even though doing so meant 
halting a $100 million federal project. 
Our individual appraisal of the wisdom or unwisdom of a particular 
course consciously selected by the Congress is to be put aside in the pro- 
cess of interpreting a statute. Once the meaning of an enactment is dis- 
cerned and its constitutionality determined, the judicial process comes to 
Heinonline - -  36 UCLA L. Rev. 588 1988-1989 
19891 DECLARATOR Y JUDGMENT ACT 
an end. We do not sit as a committee of review, nor are we vested with 
the power of veto. 
. . . .  
. . . [I]n our constitutional system the commitment to the separation 
of powers is too fundamental for us to pre-empt congressional action by 
judicially decreeing what accords with "common sense and the public 
weal." Our Constitution vests such responsibilities in the .political 
branches. 
Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 19495 (1978); accord City of New 
Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976); Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 
421 (1952). 
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APPENDIX A 
Complaint at Law in Transcript of Record at 3, American WeN 
Works Company v. Layne and Bowler Company, 241 U.S. 257 
(1916) (No. 376). 
In the Circuit Court of Arkansas County, Arkansas 
AMERICAN WELL WORKS COMPANY, Plaintiff 
v. 
LAYNE AND BOWLER COMPANY and M.F. LAYNE, Defendants 
Complaint at Law 
Plaintiff states that it is a corporation organized and existing as 
such under the laws of the State of Illinois and has complied with 
the laws of the State of Arkansas relative to foreign corporations 
transacting business in the State of Arkansas; that defendant com- 
pany is a corporation organized and existing as such under the laws 
of the State of Texas, and has offices and place of business, and 
Clerks and Managers in charge thereof in Arkansas County, State 
of Arkansas. 
Plaintiff for its complaint and cause of action against defend: 
ants states that it is engaged in the business of manufacturing and 
selling well pumps; that it owns, manufactures and sells a certain 
well pump, known as the "American Deep Well Centrifugal Tur- 
bine Pump," and has patent, or has applied for patent from the 
United States Government, for said pump and all attachments to 
and component parts thereof, and is and has been for many months 
past engaged in selling said pumps in the State of Arkansas and 
other States; that its business in owning, manufacturing, and selling 
said pumps, and in all attachments thereto and parts thereof, is le- 
gitimate and lawful in every respect, and is not an infringement and 
trespass upon the rights, property, patents, application for patents 
of defendants, or any other persons or corporations, and that de- 
fendants or either of them, do not own the aforesaid pump, or any . 
of the attachments thereto or component parts thereof, nor the pat- 
ent for same, nor have they applied for patents for same; that to 
carry on its business in manufacturitg and selling said pumps, 
plaintiff has incurred great expense, and especially so in selling and 
offering for sale its said pumps in the State of Arkansas and else- 
where; that its said pump, attachments thereto, and component 
parts thereof, have been well advertised in the State of Arkansas 
and elsewhere; and are favorably known and regarded by the public 
as being the best and highest grade standard pump on the market. 
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Plaintiff further states that defendants are also engaged in sell- 
ing well pumps, and that while defendants have full knowledge that 
plaintiff's pumps, or any attachment thereto or component parts 
thereof, are not infringements in any degree whatever upon said 
pumps of defendants, or any attachment or part thereof, yet defend- 
ants have falsely and maliciously libeled and slandered plaintiff's 
title to said pump and certain attachments and component parts 
thereof, by asserting and stating that plaintiff's pump and certain 
attachments thereto and parts thereof are infringements upon de- 
fendant's pump and certain attachments and parts thereof, all with- 
out probable cause; and, without probable cause or grounds 
therefor, have brought suits against certain parties who are using 
plaintiff's pumps, and are threatening to bring suits against any and 
all other parties who are using or contemplating using plaintiff's 
said pumps, for the purpose of collecting damages from said parties 
and involving them in litigation, and threatening to restrain them 
by proceedings in the Courts for using said pumps. 
Plaintiff further alleges that defendant Layne and defendant 
Layne & Bowler Company, through defendant Layne, its president, 
and other authorized agents and employees, have stated to divers, 
various and sundry persons that "The American (meaning and re- 
ferring to plaintiff's pump above-mentioned) is an infringement 
upon defendant's pump, and we will sue them if they sell you their 
pump, and sue you if you use the same"; and that said defendant 
Layne, and defendant company, through the president, said Layne, 
and other authorized agents and employees, maliciously stated to 
divers, sundry and various parties "We know all about how they are 
making them (meaning and referring to plaintiff's pump, attach- 
ments thereto and component parts thereof). They are just trying 
to evade our patent and they cannot do it"; and further stated 
"They (meaning and referring to plaintiff and its said pump, attach- 
ments and component parts thereof) are infringing my patents." 
Plaintiff alleges that all of said statements are made withodt 
probable cause or grounds therefor, and are done maliciously and 
with the full intent and purpose of injuring and damaging plaintiff) 
in its business and in preventing plaintiff from selling its said, 
pumps, and that said statements were so made and said suits 
brought and threatened to be brought to and against persons who 
were comtemplating and negotiating for the purchase of plaintiff's 
said pumps, and who would, but for said false, libelous and mali- 
cious statements have purchased pumps from plaintiff, and that by 
reason of said false, libelous and malicious statements plaintiff has 
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been greatly damaged in its business and injured in its reputation as 
a manufacturer and dealer in said pumps, and that said persons to 
whom said false, libelous and malicious statements were made, by 
reason thereof, have not and will not purchase plaintiff's said 
pumps. 
Plaintiff states that it makes a good and reasonable profit upon 
the sale of each one of said pumps, and that by reason of said false, 
libelous and slanderous statements made as herein alleged and set 
forth, defendants have damaged plaintiff in the actual sum of Fifty 
Thousand Dollars ($50,000.00), and that also by reason thereof 
plaintiff is entitled to recover of defendants the sum of Fifty Thou- 
sand Dollars ($50,000.00) as punitive damages, and it therefore 
prays judgment against the defendants for the sum of One Hundred 
Thousand Dollars ($100,000.00), for the costs of this suit, and for 
all other sums to which it may be entitled in the premises. 
(Signed) MANNING AND EMERSON 
Attorneys for Plaintlfl 
Complaint filed December 1 3 thy 19 12. 
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APPENDIX B 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT 
OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION 
TRIPLE-A SPECIALTY CO., ) 
Petitioner, ) 
vs. ) In Equity 
E. EDELMANN & CO., ) No. 14904 
Respondent. 1 
PETITION FOR DECLARA TOR Y DECREE, ETC. 
To the Honorable, the Judges of the United States District Court, 
for, the Northern District of Illinois: 
Petitioner, praying for the declaration and other relief sought 
herein, respectfully shows: 
1. That petitioner, Triple-A Specialty Co., is a corporation 
organized under the laws of the State of Illinois, and is a citizen and 
resident of the State of Illinois, with its principle place of business at 
Chicago, Illinois. 
2. That respondent, E. Edelmann & Co., is a corporation or- 
ganized under the laws of the State of Illinois, and is a citizen and 
resident of the State of Illinois, with its principal place of business at 
Chicago, Illinois. 
3. That petitioner and respondent are separately engaged in 
making and selling, among other things, battery testers or frost- 
gages for testing the solution in automobile radiators, and that peti- 
tioner and respondent appeal to the same customers and 
prospective customers for the sale of their respective products. 
4. That an actual controversy exists between petitioner and 
respondent, in that respondent, asserting to be the owner of United 
States Letters Patent No. 1,800,139, issued April 7, 193 1 (profert of 
a copy of which patent is hereby made), is representing to custom- 
ers of petitioner, and to prospective purchasers of petitioner's de- 
vice, and also to petitioner's agents, jobbers and dealers, that 
petitioner's No. 711 Frostgage infringes the claims of said 
Edelmann patent, and that respondent further represents to peti- 
tioner and to its customers, prospective customers, dealers, agents 
and jobbers, that they are infringing said Edelmann patent and vio- 
lating the patent statutes of the United States by the use and sale of 
petitioner's said device, respondent thus endeavoring to prevent and 
restrict the sale and use of petitioner's said device. 
Heinonline - -  36 UCLA L. Rev. 593 1988-1989 
594 UCLA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36529 
5. That no suit has been instituted by the respondent against 
petitioner, charging infringement of said patent, but that represen- 
tations have been made, wholly without foundation, to respondent's 
customers and prospective customers, to the effect that a patent suit 
is pending between respondent and petitioner, and that petitioner is 
no longer making and selling its No. 7 1 1 Frostgage, which represen- 
tations have interfered and are interfering with the lawful conduct 
of this petitioner. 
6. The jurisdiction of this court is based upon the fact that 
the actual controversy existing between petitioner and respondent 
arises under the patent laws of the United States, and is wholly a 
question of whether or not devices made and sold or offered for sale 
by petitoner infringe said Edelmann patent No. 1,800,139, and 
whether said patent is good and valid at law, questions which have 
been committed to the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States 
Courts. 
7. The jurisdiction of this court of equity arises from the fact 
that no action at law, and therefore no remedy at law exists relative 
to said controversy, and that the declaratory decree of this court 
can become effective only by further relief in the form of an injunc- 
tion to restrain respondent from making said baseless assertions 
pending the litigation, and after this court has held that said patent 
is wholly invalid or is not infringed by petitioner. 
8. That petitioner's testers or frostgages made and sold or of- 
fered for sale by petitioner do not incorporate or embody the ele- 
ments disclosed and claimed in the Edelmann patent No. 1,800,139, 
and therefore do not infringe said patent. 
9. That in the prosecution of the application on which said 
patent No. 1,800,139 was issued, applicant was compelled by the 
prior art to so restrict the claims of said patent, during the prosecu- 
tion of said application, that said claims became and are limited to a 
device containing or embodying a cushioning material or a cap of 
cushion material carried or fitted upon the float element of the 
claims, the claims having other limitations not appearing or embod- 
ied in respondent's construction, and that all of the elements of the 
thirteen claims of the Edelmann patent No. 1,800,139 are old in the 
art, and in public use. 
10. That the Frostgage made by petitioner, which is charged 
by respondent to infringe said patent, does not have a "cap of cush- 
ion material carried at one end of the float element" (as stated in 
claim 5 of the patent), nor does it have a cap or band of cushion 
material, "fitted," "carried by," "fitted around," "fitted upon," or 
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"mounted upon" the float element; on the contrary, the cushion 
material, in petitioner's construction, is not attached to or fitted 
upon the float element at all, but is entirely separate therefrom and 
appears in substantially the same position in the barrel of the tube 
as a like element appears in the prior art devices. 
11. That said Edelmann patent No. 1,800,139, and each and 
all of the claims thereof, are void, in view of the state of the art at 
the time of the patentee's alleged invention, and long prior thereto, 
and that the alleged invention claimed in said patent was not pat- 
entable, but involved nothing more than the exercise of mere 
mechanical skill. 
12. Said patent No. 1,800,139 and each and all of the claims 
thereof are wholly void because the alleged invention described and 
claimed therein, long prior to the patentee's alleged invention 
thereof, and more than two years prior to the filing of the applica- 
tion for said patent No. 1,800,139, was described and shown in 
United States patent No. 1,331,165, issued February 17, 1920, and 
in divers and sundry other patents, the numbers and dates of which 
petitioner prays leave to insert herein when known. 
13. Said patent No. 1,800,139 and each and all of the claims 
thereof are wholly void because the essential and only real differ- 
ence betwedn the device of the patent and the prior art devices lies 
in the fact that the cushion material is made a part of and attached 
to the float element, in which respect the patented construction dif- 
fers from the prior art generally, and that said difference constitutes 
a mere reversal of the devices of the prior art such as that shown in 
patent No. 1,331,165. 
14. That respondent, as incidental to the charges of infringe- 
ment made against petitioner by respondent respecting Letters 
Patent No. 1,800,139, through its officers, salesmen, and representa- 
tives (as petitioner is informed and verily believes), is representing 
that there is a suit pending between petitioner and respondent, 
based upon the alleged infringement by respondent of said patent 
No. 1,800,139, and that petitioner has ceased to manufacture or 
produce its said No. 71 1 Frostgage, all of which representations are 
wholly without foundation and are made for the express purpose of 
diverting from petitioner to respondent trade and custom which be- 
longs to and otherwise would go to petitioner, to the irreparable 
wrong, injury and damage of petitioner. 
WHEREFORE, being without adequate remedy at law, your 
petitioner prays: 
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(a) That a writ of subpoena ad respondendurn under the seal 
of this court be issued, directed to respondent, requiring it to appear 
and make answer to this petition or complaint, and to perform and 
abide by such further orders and decrees as this court may make; 
(b) That a declaratory decree be entered herein, adjudging 
said Edelmann patent No. 1,800,139, and each and all of the claims 
thereof, to be invalid, and also that none of the said claims is in- 
fringed by said Frostgage No. 71 1 made and sold by petitioner; 
(c) That respondent be enjoined, both pendente lite and per- 
manently, from suing or sending any threats of suit or infringement 
notices to customers or prospective customers of petitioner, charg- 
ing that said Frostage No. 7 1 1 infringes either or any of the claims 
of said patent No. 1,800,139, and from making any false or un- 
founded statements respecting the alleged infringement of said pat- 
ent by petitioner or any statement or statements to the effect that 
the petitioner has ceased to manufacture or sell said device; 
(d) That respondent be decreed to pay the costs of this pro- 
ceeding, including a reasonable attorney's fee to petitioner; and 
(e) That petitioner may have such further and other relief in 
the premises as to this court may.seem meet. 
TRIPLE-A SPECIALITY CO., 
/s/ 
By DYRENFORTH, LEE, 
CHRITTON & WILES 
Its Solicitors. 
/s/ 




BERNARD A. SCHROEDER, 
Of Counsel for Petitioner. 
November 2, 1935. 
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